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The Aftermath of Crawford and Davis: 
Deconstructing the Sound of Silence 
Kimberly D. Bailey 
Abstract: Victims of domestic violence often do not want to testify in 
court, and if they do, they often recant and/or testify on behalf of their 
batterers. To overcome this challenge in prosecuting these types of cases, 
prosecutors have implemented a practice of victimless prosecutions where 
the out-of-court statements of victims are used in lieu of their live 
testimony in court. This practice has been limited, however, by the 
United States Supreme Court cases Crawford v. Washington and 
Davis v. Washington, which limit the use of out-of-court testimonial 
statements in criminal cases when the defendant has not had an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness. For this reason, some out-of-
court statements are no longer admissible in domestic violence trials. In 
evaluating how this change should affect the future prosecutions of 
domestic violence cases, this Article critiques the practice of victimless 
prosecutions from the perspective of the victim. Specifically, this Article 
proposes that scholars consider whether victimless prosecutions have been 
effective in meeting the goals of victim safety, gender equality, and 
autonomy. Drawing upon feminist scholarship and literature on the 
legal silencing of subordinate groups, it explores whether victimless 
prosecutions may discourage women from speaking, which is an 
important act of empowerment. More importantly, because victimless 
prosecutions remove victims from the prosecution process, they no longer 
interact and engage in a dialogue with the criminal justice system. This 
legal silence may allow the legal system to ignore victims and to pursue 
its own agenda of successful prosecutions, may limit the criminal justice 
system’s ability to get direct input from victims on whether these laws 
and policies are effective, and may make victims complicit in their 
subordination as women. While this Article acknowledges that 
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victimless prosecutions may be appropriate for some victims, given the 
potential harm of victim silencing and the fact that Crawford and 
Davis will limit the use of victimless prosecutions in at least some cases, 
the criminal justice system should evaluate whether there are victims 
who can and will testify. Directly addressing some of the reasons that 
victims do not testify may limit victim silence, which may be a better 
long-term approach to the domestic violence problem. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark 
decision, Crawford v. Washington,1 which changed the landscape of 
the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
Crawford held that out-of-court statements that are “testimonial” 
cannot be admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted in a 
criminal trial unless (1) the declarant is unavailable, and (2) the 
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.2  
After Crawford, it was not clear how this decision might impact 
domestic violence prosecutions. Specifically, Crawford foreshadowed 
the possible end of what some call victimless prosecutions,3 in which 
victims’ statements from 911 calls and police statements are used in 
lieu of the victims’ live testimony at trial.  
After much anticipation, the United States Supreme Court finally 
spoke on this issue in Davis v. Washington.4 Unfortunately, the 
language that the Court adopted in Davis did not provide the 
definitive answer that prosecutors, defense counsel, and lower courts 
anticipated.5 The Court held that out-of-court statements are 
nontestimonial when they are “made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
                                                
 1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2. Id. at 68. 
 3. These types of prosecutions are also sometimes referred to as “evidence based” 
prosecutions. See, e.g., National District Attorneys Association, Evidence Based Prosecution of 
Domestic Violence Cases, http://www.ndaa.org/education/ndaa/nac_evidence_based_ 
prosecution_domestive_violence_cases.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2009). 
 4. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 5. See id. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that 
the majority’s test in Davis is unpredictable); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: 
Domestic Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2006) 
[hereinafter Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle] (arguing that Davis offers little guidance to 
lower courts or predictability to litigants). 
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meet an ongoing emergency.”6 These statements are testimonial 
when “the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant 
to later criminal prosecution.”7  
After Davis, there is no question that in some circumstances, 
victimless prosecutions will no longer be a viable option for 
prosecutors of domestic violence cases. Specifically, if lower courts 
are true to Crawford, many out-of-court statements should no 
longer be admissible in domestic violence trials because the 
Crawford opinion expressed a specific animus toward the 
government’s involvement in the production of evidence. In 
preparation for domestic violence trials, government actors 
frequently use many statements that are produced in a sophisticated 
manner. 
The purpose of this Article is not to provide a critique of the 
Davis and Crawford opinions.8 Instead, given the limitation on the 
use of victimless prosecutions, this Article attempts to grapple with 
how prosecutors should handle domestic violence cases post-
Crawford and post-Davis. As part of my analysis, I critique the 
practice of victimless prosecutions from the perspective of the victim. 
Specifically, I invite scholars to consider whether victimless 
prosecutions have actually helped domestic violence victims in the 
manner that they were originally intended to help them. In addition, 
scholars should explore whether these types of prosecutions might 
have negative, although unintended, consequences for domestic 
violence victims.  
Indeed, the term victimless prosecution is itself problematic 
because it suggests that there is no victim in this legal process. Of 
course, there is a victim, but the victim’s presence, specifically her 
voice, is limited. The practice of victimless prosecutions actually 
                                                
 6. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 7. Id. 
 8. For examples of articles that critique these opinions, see Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic 
Violence Cases After Davis: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 759 (2007) 
(arguing that Davis is unsatisfactory for both prosecutors and defense lawyers because it still is 
not clear which out-of-court statements violate the Confrontation Clause in the domestic 
violence context), Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 5, at 5 (criticizing the Court’s 
analysis of the Confrontation Clause in the domestic violence context), and Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 801, 825–34 (2007) [hereinafter Tuerkheimer, 
Exigency] (criticizing the Court’s analysis of the Confrontation Clause in the domestic violence 
context). 
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arose out of necessity, and I certainly do not want to suggest that 
prosecutors or other legal actors in the criminal justice system 
actively seek to limit the voice of domestic violence victims. Indeed, 
domestic violence victims do not testify for a variety of reasons, many 
of which have nothing to do with the criminal justice system or its 
actors.9 
Yet, the reality is that once the victim’s statement is taken from a 
911 call or from a police officer, the prosecutor need not hear from 
her again. We do hear a limited form of the victim’s voice at trial, 
but victimless prosecutions arguably lead to a practice where the 
victim’s voice is not heard throughout most of the prosecution 
process, nor is it considered in the development of domestic violence 
policy. In addition, when the prosecution of the batterer is not in the 
victim’s best interest,10 her wishes may be ignored. 
Part I of this Article discusses the history of domestic violence 
criminal law and the role that the women’s movement played in the 
evolution of the law. Specifically, the issue of domestic violence 
became more of a public issue rather than just a private one. By 
focusing on this important issue, the women’s movement had two 
important goals: (1) to keep women physically, mentally, and 
emotionally safe;11 and (2) to attack the legal and political structures 
that subordinate women and that allow domestic violence to exist in 
the first place. Part I also discusses how this movement led to 
aggressive arrest and prosecution policies. These policies ultimately 
led to victimless prosecutions, which allowed prosecutors to 
aggressively prosecute domestic violence perpetrators without the 
testimony of victims, who often do not want to testify.  
                                                
 9. See infra Part I.D. 
 10. See infra Part I.C.3 (discussing how some experts and scholars argue that mandatory 
arrest and prosecution policies may make violence worse for some domestic violence victims). 
 11. While men can also be victims of domestic violence, eighty-five percent of 
victimizations by intimate partners in 2001 were against women. Callie Marie Rennison, 
Intimate Partner Violence, 1993–2001, BUREAU JUST. STAT. CRIME DATA BRIEF, Feb. 2003, 
at 1, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf. In addition, domestic 
violence occurs in both heterosexual and homosexual relationships. Scholars have discussed the 
importance of recognizing that domestic violence occurs in circumstances outside of the 
woman victim/heterosexual relationship dynamic. See, e.g., Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing 
Without Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate 
Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582 (1996); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and 
Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 520 (1992). While additional dynamics may be explored in future works, this Article 
focuses on women victims in heterosexual relationships. 
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Part II discusses Crawford and the sophisticated manner in 
which statements from 911 calls and police statements are gathered 
and preserved for use at domestic violence trials. Based on 
Crawford’s specific concern with the involvement of government 
actors in the production of evidence, this Part argues that lower 
courts should interpret Davis to limit this type of sophisticated 
practice. 
Part III then argues that while the original intent of victimless 
prosecutions may have been to protect women, there is no real 
evidence that all women are actually safer when they do not testify 
than when they do testify. In light of this lack of evidence, I draw 
upon feminist scholarship and literature on the legal silencing of 
subordinate groups to query whether a nondiscriminatory use of 
victimless prosecutions is effective in realizing the women’s 
movement’s original goals of safety, gender equality, and autonomy. 
Victimless prosecutions may encourage women to remain silent 
when speech is an important act of empowerment in and of itself. 
Most obviously, victims are silent because they are not testifying and 
speaking out against their batterers. More importantly, because 
victimless prosecutions remove victims from the prosecution process, 
victims no longer interact and engage in a dialogue with the criminal 
justice system.  
This legal silence may be problematic for three reasons. First, it 
may allow the legal system to ignore victims and to pursue its own 
agenda of successful prosecutions when the needs of these victims 
should be an important focus of legitimate domestic violence laws 
and policies. Second, it may limit the criminal justice system’s ability 
to get direct input from victims on whether these laws and policies 
are effective. Third, it may make victims complicit with their own 
subordination as women.  
Part IV of this Article, therefore, argues that given the legal 
limitations that Crawford and Davis place on victimless prosecutions 
and the possibility that these types of prosecutions might be harmful 
for some victims, we should develop ways to directly address the 
reasons that women may hesitate to testify. While one response to 
Crawford and Davis could be that prosecutors automatically dismiss 
most prosecutions because most women recant or refuse to testify,12 
                                                
 12. Tom Lininger conducted surveys that found a substantial drop in domestic violence 
prosecutions after Crawford. Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 747, 749–50 (2005). Specifically, he found that during the summer of 2004 half of the 
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a better response would be to find more ways to encourage women 
to participate in the system. I discuss three key reasons why women 
fail to participate: a lack of material resources, a lack of protection 
from batterers, and poor interactions with the criminal justice 
system. I then use Chicago’s “Target Abuser Call” (“TAC”) 
program as a potential model of a program that, at this time, seems 
to be successful in encouraging victim participation by addressing 
some of these reasons.  
I caution, however, that there are two reasons that a systematic 
implementation of similar programs will be difficult. First, 
jurisdictions are plagued by limited resources. Second, many 
domestic violence victims and legal actors may be skeptical that 
victims can and will testify. For this reason, legal actors may be 
tempted to fit as many statements as possible under Davis’ 
“nontestimonial” category instead of determining whether a 
victimless prosecution is necessary or desirable in a particular case. 
To address both of these issues, I apply Dan Kahan’s “gentle 
nudges” approach to “sticky norms” and suggest that jurisdictions 
might have to implement programs similar to TAC on an 
incremental basis by first focusing on a small subset of victims of 
high-risk offenders. Kahan has theorized that small changes over 
time are the most successful in creating institutional change in the 
enforcement of laws by legal actors. Incremental changes also put 
less of a burden on jurisdictions that have limited financial resources. 
I. THE HISTORY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMINAL LAW PRE-
CRAWFORD 
A. Domestic Violence: A Private Matter 
Domestic violence is a serious problem in the United States. 
Between 2001 and 2005, twenty-two percent of nonfatal violent 
crimes against women involved intimate partner violence.13 In 
addition, thirty percent of all female murder victims were killed by an 
intimate during this time period. It is difficult to know the exact 
                                                                                                           
domestic violence cases set for trial in Dallas County, Texas, were dismissed because of 
evidentiary problems. Id. In addition, in a survey of over sixty prosecution offices in California, 
Oregon, and Washington, seventy-six percent indicated that their offices were more likely to 
drop domestic violence charges when the victims recant or refuse to cooperate post-Crawford. 
Id. at 750. 
 13. SHANNON CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T JUST., INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf. 
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figures regarding domestic violence, however, because of the 
likelihood of underreporting.14  
While domestic violence has always been prevalent in the United 
States, this country has not always criminally sanctioned it. By 1920, 
wife beating was illegal in all states.15 Yet for several decades, law 
enforcement and prosecutors did little to enforce these laws.16 The 
criminal legal system treated disputes between a husband and his 
wife as a private matter, and if the police did respond to a call, the 
typical response was to separate the parties involved and to advise the 
boyfriend or spouse to calm down.17  
Two important catalysts, however, eventually moved domestic 
violence away from the private sphere into the public sphere: the 
women’s movement18 and civil lawsuits against cities that failed to 
protect battered women.19 
B. Domestic Violence: A Move to the Public Domain 
Participants in the women’s movement were concerned about 
domestic violence for two main reasons. First, they worried about 
the emotional, physical, and mental safety of women.20 Second, they 
viewed domestic violence as a manifestation of women’s legal and 
political subordination both inside and outside of the home.21 
Frustrated that the police minimized or ignored domestic violence, 
feminists made the crime of domestic violence an important public 
issue in the 1960s and 1970s. Specifically, they criticized state 
                                                
 14. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1991). 
 15. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857 (1996). 
 16. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating As a Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117, 2170–71 (1996). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Specifically, members of the movement protested, created shelters where victims 
could find refuge, and led educational campaigns designed to change attitudes about domestic 
violence. Linda G. Mills, Commentary: Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse & the Violence of 
State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 557 (1999); see also Siegel, supra note 16, at 2171. 
 19. Mills, supra note 18, at 558–59; Siegel, supra note 16, at 2171. 
 20. Mills, supra note 18, at 557. 
 21. Hanna, supra note 15, at 1854; see also Schneider, supra note 11, at 527; Siegel, 
supra note 16, at 2128–29. 
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inaction in curbing the problem of domestic violence and advocated 
the reform of institutional responses in the criminal justice system.22  
Large civil awards against cities that failed to protect women who 
were victims of domestic violence also created a sea of change in the 
way that law enforcement reacted to reports of domestic abuse. In 
Sorechetti v. City of New York, the New York Court of Appeals 
awarded the plaintiff a $2 million judgment.23 In this case, the 
plaintiff’s father attacked her with a fork, knife, and screwdriver, and 
he tried to dismember her leg with a saw.24 The court found that the 
police had a special duty to protect a battered woman and her 
daughter and that this duty was breached when the police failed to 
investigate a report that the daughter had not returned from a visit 
with her father.25 
Similarly, Tracy Thurman received $2.9 million dollars after 
suing the city of Torrington, Connecticut.26 Thurman’s estranged 
husband had been put on probation for smashing the windshield of 
her car while she was still in it.27 Yet, even after he repeatedly 
violated the terms of his probation and restraining order, the police 
failed to arrest him.28 On one particular day, Thurman called the 
police after her estranged husband violated his restraining order.29 
Before the police officer arrived, however, her husband stabbed her 
repeatedly and severely injured her.30 The court found that the police 
had violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
by treating violence by male intimates differently from violence 
committed by strangers.31 
                                                
 22. Mills, supra note 18, at 557. It is also worth noting that there was a women’s 
movement in the 1850s that also advocated against domestic violence and in favor of a 
structural remedy against this problem. Siegel, supra note 16, at 2128–29. 
 23. Sorechetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 1985). 
 24. Id. at 72–74. 
 25. Id. at 76–77. 
 26. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984); Mills, supra 
note 18, at 1525–26. 
 27. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1525. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1525–26. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1527–29. 
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C. The Rise of Mandatory Policies 
In response to both the women’s movement and civil litigation 
against police departments, legislators and prosecutors took 
increased action to curb domestic violence on an institutional level. 
As discussed below, states adopted mandatory arrest and prosecution 
policies. These policies, and their results, however, received mixed 
reactions from advocates of domestic violence victims. 
1. Mandatory and pro-arrest policies 
In an attempt to increase the institutional response of the 
criminal justice system, Oregon passed the first mandatory arrest 
statute in the country in 1977.32 The statute required police to arrest 
a suspect if there was probable cause that he had committed a 
misdemeanor domestic violence offense.33 In the early 1980s, 
Lawrence Sherman, supported by the National Institute of Justice 
(“NIJ”), conducted a study of the Minneapolis Police Department.34 
Sherman conducted a field experiment of misdemeanor spousal 
abuse with three intervention strategies: arrest, ordering the suspect 
away from the scene for twenty-four hours, and trying to restore 
order.35 Based on the results from this experiment, Sherman 
concluded that arrest was the most effective treatment in reducing 
the likelihood of renewed violence.36  
As a result, in 1984, the United States Attorney General 
recommended that arrest be the standard police response to 
domestic violence offenses.37 In 1994, Congress passed the Violence 
Against Women Act (“VAWA”), which included a provision 
authorizing the Attorney General to make grants available to state 
and local governments that implemented mandatory or pro-arrest 
programs.38  
                                                
 32. Joan Zorza, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence: Why It May Prove the Best First 
Step in Curbing Repeat Abuse, 10 CRIM. JUST. 2, 4 (1995). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Richard A. Berk et al., Studies: A Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado Springs Spouse 
Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170, 170–71 (1992). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Hanna, supra note 15, at 1859. 
 38. 42 U.S.C.S. § 3796hh (LexisNexis 2008). It is also worth noting that VAWA 
originally included a civil remedy provision that was intended to provide victims of “gender 
motivated violence” a federal civil cause of action against their perpetrators. 42 U.S.C.S. § 
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Sherman and other experts now question some of the results of 
his original study, however. After Sherman’s initial study in 
Minneapolis, he and other experts conducted replication studies that 
were funded by the NIJ in six different cities.39 The results from the 
experiments in Omaha, Nebraska and Charlotte, North Carolina 
suggested that arrest was no more of a deterrent than other types of 
police responses.40 The results from the experiment in Milwaukee 
suggested that arrest reduced the likelihood of renewed violence for 
employed, married, high school graduate, white suspects, but 
increased the likelihood of renewed violence for unemployed, 
unmarried, high school dropout African-American suspects.41 These 
                                                                                                           
13981 (LexisNexis 2008). The Supreme Court ultimately struck down this provision. United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 39. Berk et al., supra note 34, at 171, 173–74; Lawrence W. Sherman et al., The 
Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 168 (1992). Joan Zorza has criticized the validity of the 
replication studies, however, arguing that none of them fully replicated the original 
Minneapolis study or each other; each study had its own definition of a domestic relationship, 
and the type of police responses used in each study differed. Zorza, supra note 32, at 4–5. 
Critics of the NIJ studies also argue that it is incorrect to assume that renewed violence is a 
retaliatory response to arrest when the NIJ studies showed fewer reoffenses in the short term, 
and those treating batterers believe any retaliation from arrest would happen shortly after 
arrest. Frisch, Commentaries: Research that Succeeds, Policies that Fail, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 209, 213 (1992); Zorza, supra note 32, at 8; see also Cynthia Grant Bowman, 
The Arrest Experiments: A Feminist Critique, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 201, 204 (1992) 
(arguing that the lower recidivism rate for employed men may be because their partners do not 
report future violence out of fear of sacrificing their lifestyle and status); Donna Coker, Crime 
Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 801, 856 (2001) (citing a study that reviewed the NIJ arrest study data in Milwaukee and 
concluded that residence in the most marginalized neighborhoods is a stronger predictor of 
increased violence following arrest than unemployment status). But see Emily J. Sack, Battered 
Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
1657, 1678 (stating that more recent analysis of the NIJ replication studies shows that there is 
a reduction in recidivism among domestic violence offenders who are arrested). 
 40. Berk et al., supra note 34, at 171–72; J. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchinson, III, 
Female Spouse Abuse and the Police Response: The Charlotte, North Carolina Experiment, 83 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73, 115 (1992). 
 41. Sherman et al., supra note 39, at 168; see also Berk et al., supra note 34, at 173–74. 
In the end, only five of the six replication studies were completed. Christopher D. Maxwell, 
Joel H. Garner & Jeffrey A. Fagan, The Effects of Arrest on Intimate Partner Violence: New 
Evidence from the Spouse Assault Replication Program, NAT’L INST. JUST. RESEARCH BRIEF, 
July 2001, at 9, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188199.pdf (reanalyzing 
data from the replication studies and concluding that there is “good evidence of a consistent 
and direct, though modest, deterrent effect of arrest on aggression by males against their 
female intimate partners”). Ultimately, “the published results from the five replication 
experiments produced inconsistent findings about whether arrest deters intimate partner 
violence.” Id. at 1. 
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replication studies have also been criticized.42 Nevertheless, all fifty 
states now allow warrantless arrests in cases where there is probable 
cause of a misdemeanor domestic violence offense,43 and most states 
have enacted preferential or mandatory arrest statutes.44  
2. No-drop prosecution policies 
Similar to the lax response of police departments before 
mandatory policies, prosecutors often dismissed cases upon the belief 
that domestic violence was a private matter or that the victims would 
eventually drop the charges on their own.45 Once mandatory arrest 
policies became more prevalent, however, the police and prosecutors 
believed that arresting perpetrators of domestic violence would be 
meaningless unless these individuals were aggressively prosecuted. As 
a result, no-drop prosecution policies naturally followed mandatory 
arrest policies.46  
No-drop policies require prosecutors to prosecute domestic 
violence cases regardless of the victim’s wishes.47 “Soft” no-drop 
policies allow victims to make the choice to drop charges under 
certain specified conditions such as watching a video on domestic 
                                                
 42. Joan Zorza has criticized the validity of the replication studies, arguing that none of 
them fully replicated the original Minneapolis study or each other, each study had its own 
definition of a domestic relationship, and the type of police responses used in each study 
differed. Zorza, supra note 32, at 5–6. Critics of the NIJ studies also argue that it is incorrect 
to assume that renewed violence is a retaliatory response to arrest when the NIJ studies showed 
fewer reoffenses in the short term, and those treating batterers believe any retaliation from 
arrest would happen shortly after arrest. Frisch, supra note 39, at 213; Zorza, supra note 32, at 
8; see also Bowman, supra note 39, at 204 (arguing that the lower recidivism rate for employed 
men may be because their partners do not report future violence out of fear of sacrificing their 
lifestyle and status); Coker, supra note 39, at 856 (citing study that reviewed the NIJ arrest 
study data in Milwaukee and that concluded that residence in the most marginalized 
neighborhoods is a stronger predictor of increased violence following arrest than 
unemployment status). But see Sack, supra note 39, at 1678 (stating that more recent reanalysis 
of the NIJ replication studies shows that there is a reduction in recidivism among domestic 
violence offenders who are arrested). 
 43. Prior to 1984, most police officers could not arrest a suspect without a warrant 
unless the misdemeanor was committed in the officer’s presence. Officers could arrest a suspect 
without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that a felony had been committed. 
Hanna, supra note 15, at 1859. 
 44. Id. at 1859–60. 
 45. Laurence Busching, Exploring the Future of the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its 
Past: Rethinking Strategies for Prosecution of Domestic Violence in the Wake of Crawford, 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 391, 392 (2005). 
 46. Mills, supra note 18, at 561. 
 47. Id. 
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violence, speaking to a counselor, or appearing before a judge to 
explain reasons for wanting to drop the charges.48 “Hard” no-drop 
policies require prosecutors to proceed with a case regardless of the 
victim’s wishes if there is enough evidence to go forward to trial.49 
Sometimes hard no-drop jurisdictions will even sanction or arrest 
victims who refuse to voluntarily participate in the prosecution.50 
Most jurisdictions with no-drop policies, however, do not force 
victims to participate in the prosecution.51 
3. Responses to mandatory policies 
Advocates of domestic violence victims have had mixed reactions 
to mandatory policies. Some commentators, such as Cheryl Hanna, 
are in favor of mandatory prosecutions, arguing that the choice to 
prosecute must be taken away from victims if prosecutors are serious 
about sending a clear message that domestic violence is criminally 
unacceptable.52 In addition, Hanna argues that allowing women to 
choose will give batterers an incentive to intimidate women into not 
testifying.53 Hanna also believes that lax prosecution will decrease 
police officers’ confidence in the value of arrest and will undermine 
their diligence in policing domestic violence.54  
Furthermore, Hanna argues that batterers are not just a threat to 
their partners, but they are also a threat to society.55 She refers to 
research that suggests that violent offenders in a family are more 
likely to assault nonfamily members.56 She also notes that batterers 
will continue to be abusive to future partners and that mandatory 
policies protect children from violence.57 
Other commentators, such as Linda Mills, argue that mandatory 
policies contain many of the emotionally abusive elements of a 
victim’s relationship with a batterer because mandatory policies do 
not consider the woman’s personal perspective and circumstances.58 
                                                
 48. Coker, supra note 39, at 843; Hanna, supra note 15, at 1863–63. 
 49. Hanna, supra note 15, at 1863. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. at 1850. 
 53. Id. at 1892. 
 54. Id. at 1893. 
 55. Id. at 1889. 
 56. Id. at 1889. 
 57. Id. at 1895–96. 
 58. Mills, supra note 18, at 568–69. 
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Mills argues, “[W]e should be charged with hearing her story on her 
terms and in ways that take into account her particular 
circumstances. Only after we attend to this clinical task should we 
consider the larger feminist interest.”59 In support, Mills refers to the 
replica study conducted by Lawrence Sherman in 1992 that 
suggested that violence may increase after the arrest of unemployed, 
unmarried, high school dropout African-Americans, and argues that 
mandatory policies might actually increase the level of violence 
certain women experience.60 
Others have noted other potential risks under mandatory 
policies. First, there has been some evidence of an increase in dual 
arrests during which victims are arrested along with the perpetrator 
because the police claim that they cannot determine who was the 
aggressor in the attack.61 Donna Coker notes that women who are 
arrested risk losing custody of their children, may be barred for life 
from receiving welfare benefits, and may have student financial aid 
compromised.62 She also notes that arrests of immigrant women also 
have disastrous effects because, not having proper legal counsel, they 
often plea bargain in order to avoid jail time, which can result in 
deportation.63 Coker thus argues that mandatory policies might deter 
these women from seeking help from police at all.64 
Regardless of the possible shortcomings of mandatory polices, 
however, it seems clear that they created a tangible shift in the 
criminal justice system’s response to domestic violence.65 Specifically, 
                                                
 59. Id. at 569. 
 60. Id. at 565–68; see also Coker, supra note 39, at 820 (arguing that more research is 
needed to determine how arrest policies specifically affect poor women, women of color, and 
immigrant women). 
 61. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1171, 1184–86 (2002) (noting that many statutes have “primary aggressor” language 
that required the police to determine who was the most significant aggressor). But see David 
Hirschel et al., Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: To What Extent Do They 
Influence Police Arrest Decisions?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255, 296 (2007) (finding 
that overall dual arrest rates are low in domestic violence cases, but also noting that there are 
considerable variations in dual arrest rates both among and within states). 
 62. Coker, supra note 39, at 830. 
 63. Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and 
Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1048–49 (2000). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Indeed, between 1993 and 2001, the number of incidents of nonfatal intimate 
violence against women in the United States decreased by half. Myrna Raeder, Remember the 
Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 311, 326 (2005). Whether mandatory policies effected this decrease remains 
to be seen, but Myrna Raeder cautions that some of this decrease may be illusory and that the 
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the criminal justice system now treats domestic violence as more of a 
public issue, not a private one. 
D. The Use of Out-of-Court Statements 
One of the impediments prosecutors face in trying to implement 
no-drop prosecution policies is the fact that many victims of 
domestic violence do not want to testify in court, and if they do, 
they often recant or testify on behalf of their batterers.66 Prosecutors 
estimate that approximately eighty percent of domestic violence 
victims are uncooperative.67 The reasons for this non-cooperation 
may include financial dependence, fear, poor interactions with actors 
in the criminal justice system, low self-esteem, and sympathy for the 
assailant.68 As a result, during trial, prosecutors often use the out-of-
court statements of these victims, instead of their live testimony.69 
Two United States Supreme Court cases made the use of out-of-
court statements at trial possible: Ohio v. Roberts70 and White v. 
Illinois.71 In Roberts, the state offered a transcript of a witness’s 
testimony from a preliminary hearing as evidence at trial.72 Roberts 
objected and argued that the admission violated the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.73 The Supreme Court 
determined that in order for out-of-court statements to be 
admissible under the restrictions of the Confrontation Clause, the 
prosecution usually must either produce the declarant or 
demonstrate the declarant’s unavailability.74 The Court determined 
that even if the prosecution can show that the witness is unavailable, 
the prosecution must also show that the evidence bears “indicia of 
reliability.”75 The Court stated that when evidence falls within a 
                                                                                                           
“one-size-fits-all” approach of mandatory policies “clearly disadvantaged some women, 
disempowered others and did not uniformly lead to lesser risks of violence.” Id. at 330. 
 66. Lininger, supra note 12, at 751. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.; see also David Jaros, The Lessons of People v. Moscat: Confronting Judicial Bias in 
Domestic Violence Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 995, 
1002 (2005); infra Part IV. 
 69. Lininger, supra note 12, at 751–52. 
 70. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 71. 502 U.S. 346 (1991). 
 72. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59. 
 73. Id. at 59. 
 74. Id. at 65. The Court noted that unavailability is not required when the utility of 
confrontation is remote. Id. at 65 n.7. 
 75. Id. at 65. 
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firmly rooted hearsay exception or when there is a showing of 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” reliability can be 
inferred.76 In Roberts, the Court determined that the witness was 
unavailable.77 In addition, the Court held that the preliminary 
hearing transcript bore sufficient “indicia of reliability” for 
Confrontation Clause purposes because (1) the defendant had 
adequate opportunity to cross examine the witness during the 
preliminary hearing and (2) his counsel availed himself of his 
opportunity to do so.78  
In White, the Court was asked to determine whether the 
Confrontation Clause required the prosecution to produce a 
declarant or to show the declarant’s unavailability before introducing 
testimony under the “spontaneous declaration” and “medical 
examination” hearsay exceptions.79 Noting that aspects of 
spontaneous declarations and statements made during medical 
diagnosis could not be recaptured during in-court testimony and 
that there was a threat of losing the evidentiary value of these 
statements during in-court testimony, the Court refused to extend 
the unavailability requirement to these types of statements.80 
Although the specific issue of whether spontaneous declarations 
and medical diagnosis statements were “firmly rooted” hearsay 
exceptions for Confrontation Clause purposes was not before the 
Court in White, prosecutors and lower courts inferred from that 
decision that they were. As a result, prosecutors began to rely on the 
use of these types of hearsay statements to prove their cases in 
domestic violence cases.81 
At first glance, the use of these out-of-court statements in lieu of 
live testimony seems to be a proper solution to the problem of 
reluctant domestic violence witnesses. When allowed to utilize such 
statements, prosecutors are no longer faced with the dilemma of 
having to choose to either drop cases against batterers or force 
victims to testify. If prosecutors drop cases, batterers get away with 
their crimes. Moreover, by dropping cases, prosecutors arguably 
                                                
 76. Id. at 66. 
 77. Id. at 75. 
 78. Id. at 73–75. 
 79. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 348–49 (1991). 
 80. Id. at 354–57. 
 81. Lininger, supra note 12, at 771. 
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allow batterers to control the prosecution process; all batterers have 
to do is threaten their victims, and the charges will be dropped.82 
Equally problematic is the practice of forcing victims to testify 
against their will. If one of the purposes of prosecuting batterers is to 
limit the amount of violence that women experience, we certainly do 
not want to put women at risk of retaliatory violence by forcing 
them to testify. In addition, it seems cruel to threaten these women 
with the prospect of imprisonment if they refuse to testify when they 
have already been victimized in their homes. 
Arguably, the use of out-of-court statements in domestic 
violence cases simultaneously allows prosecutors to prosecute 
batterers, to keep victims safe from retaliatory violence, and to lessen 
the burdens on women to testify. Part II, however, explains how the 
Crawford and Davis opinions probably limit the feasibility of this 
practice in many domestic violence cases. 
II. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON, DAVIS V. WASHINGTON AND 
THEIR AFTERMATH 
A. Crawford v. Washington 
Although prosecutors partially relied on White in introducing the 
out-of-court statements of domestic violence victims at trial, Justice 
Thomas’ concurrence in that opinion, to which Justice Scalia joined, 
began to express some doubt regarding the path that the Court’s 
jurisprudence took with respect to the Confrontation Clause.83 
Specifically, Justice Thomas expressed concern that the Court had 
unnecessarily “complicated and confused the relationship between 
the constitutional right of confrontation and the hearsay rules of 
evidence.”84 He suggested that the Court interpret the 
Confrontation Clause in a way that was more “faithful to both the 
provision’s text and history.”85 Justice Thomas’ concurrence, 
therefore, seemed to foreshadow part of Justice Scalia’s analysis in 
Crawford v. Washington. 
In Crawford, police arrested Crawford for the stabbing death of 
Kenneth Lee.86 After providing Miranda warnings, police questioned 
                                                
 82. See Hanna, supra note 15, at 1850–52. 
 83. See White, 502 U.S. at 358. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 365. 
 86. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004). 
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Crawford and his wife twice. Crawford ultimately confessed that he 
and his wife went to look for Lee after Crawford learned that Lee 
had allegedly attempted to rape Crawford’s wife Sylvia. After the 
Crawfords found Lee in his apartment, a fight ensued, Lee was 
stabbed in the torso, and Crawford’s hand was cut.87 During his 
account of the fight, Crawford stated that he believed that Lee had 
something in his hand, Crawford grabbed for it, and Crawford’s 
hand got cut.88 Crawford’s wife’s statements to the police during her 
interrogation, however, were arguably different with respect to 
whether Lee had a weapon.89 
Crawford was charged with assault and attempted murder.90 At 
trial, Crawford claimed self-defense, and his wife did not testify 
because of a state marital privilege.91 Because this privilege did not 
extend to out-of-court statements admissible under a hearsay 
exception, the state introduced Crawford’s wife’s police 
interrogation as a statement against penal interest.92 Crawford 
objected on the ground that the introduction of this statement 
violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.93 Applying 
Roberts, the trial court admitted the statement, finding that it had a 
                                                
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 38–39. 
 89. During her interrogation, Sylvia stated the following: 
Q: Did Kenny do anything to fight back from this assault? 
A: (pausing) I know he reached into his pocket . . . or somethin’ . . . I don’t know 
what. 
Q: After he was stabbed? 
A: He saw Michael coming up. He lifted his hand . . . his chest open, he might 
[have] went to go strike his hand out or something and then (inaudible). 
Q: Okay, you, you gotta speak up. 
A: Okay, he lifted his hand over his head maybe to strike Michael’s hand down or 
something and then he put his hands in his . . . put his right hand in his right pocket 
. . . took a step back . . . Michael proceeded to stab him . . . then his hands were like 
. . . how do you explain this . . . open arms . . . with his hands open and he fell 
down . . . and we ran (describing subject holding hands open, palms toward 
assailant). 
Q: Okay, when he’s standing there with his open hands, you’re talking about 
Kenny, correct? 
A: Yeah, after, after the fact, yes. 
Q: Did you see anything in hands at that point? 
A: (pausing) um um (no). 
Id. at 39–40. 
 90. Id. at 40. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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“particularized guarantee[] of trustworthiness.”94 The Washington 
Court of Appeals, however, reversed and applied a nine-factor test to 
determine that the statement was not trustworthy.95 The Washington 
Supreme Court reinstated the conviction after determining that 
Crawford’s wife’s statement bore guarantees of trustworthiness 
because it was “virtually identical” to Crawford’s statement.96 
The United States Supreme Court held that the admission of his 
wife’s statement was a violation of Crawford’s confrontation rights.97 
Justice Scalia, writing the majority opinion, rejected the reliability 
test in Roberts, performed a historical analysis of the Confrontation 
Clause,98 and introduced a new rule: when an out-of-court statement 
is “testimonial,” the Sixth Amendment requires that it cannot be 
introduced at a criminal trial unless the declarant is unavailable and 
the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant.99  
Justice Scalia noted that although the right of confrontation 
dates back to Roman times, the founding generation’s source of the 
concept was the common law.100 He contrasted the English common 
law practice of live in-court testimony subject to adversarial testing 
and the continental civil law practice of private examination by 
judicial officers.101 Justice Scalia pointed out, however, that English 
courts sometimes adopted this civil law practice. The “bail a 
                                                
 94. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). Specifically, the trial court 
found the statement trustworthy because Sylvia was not shifting blame, but was corroborating 
her husband’s story that he was acting in self-defense. Id. In addition, the trial court 
determined that Sylvia had direct knowledge of the events, was describing recent events, and 
“was being questioned by a ‘neutral’ law enforcement officer.” Id. 
 95. Id. at 41. Some facts that the Court of Appeals relied upon in its determination that 
the statement was not trustworthy were that the statement contradicted one that Sylvia had 
already given, it was made in response to specific questions, and at one point, Sylvia admitted 
that she had shut her eyes during the stabbing. Id. Furthermore, the court rejected the state’s 
argument that Sylvia and Michael’s statements “interlocked” given the fact that they differed 
on an issue critical to Michael’s self-defense claim. Id. 
 96. Id. (quoting Washington v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663 (Wash. 2002), rev’d, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004) ). 
 97. Id. at 68. 
 98. For critiques regarding the accuracy of Scalia’s version of legal history, see generally 
Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know and When Did They Know It? Fictional 
Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005); Roger W. Kirst, Does 
Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35 
(2005). 
 99. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 100. Id. at 43. 
 101. Id. 
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committal statutes,” two statutes passed during Queen Mary’s reign 
in the Sixteenth Century, made it a routine practice for justices of 
the peace and other officials to examine suspects and witnesses 
before trial and to read these examinations at trial in lieu of live 
testimony.102 Justice Scalia expressed doubt as to whether the 
original purpose of the justice of the peace examinations was to 
produce evidence admissible at trial, but noted that that was the 
ultimate result.103 
Justice Scalia determined that this history “supports two 
inferences about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.”104 “First, 
the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was 
the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of 
ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”105 Second, 
testimonial statements are not admissible if the witness does not 
appear at trial “unless he [is] unavailable . . . and the defendant [has] 
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”106 
Justice Scalia determined that “[s]tatements taken by police 
officers in the course of [an] interrogation[] are . . . testimonial . . . 
.”107 He reasoned that “[p]olice interrogations bear a striking 
resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace,” who had both 
investigatory and prosecutorial functions.108 Justice Scalia stated that 
“[t]he involvement of government officers in the production of 
testimonial evidence presents the same risk whether the officers are 
police or justices of the peace.”109 Justice Scalia then explained that 
he was using the term “interrogation” in its colloquial sense, but his 
definition included any statement “knowingly given in response to 
structured police questioning.”110 Later in the opinion, Justice Scalia 
stated, “[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production of 
testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for 
prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and again throughout a 
history with which the Framers were keenly familiar.”111 
                                                
 102. Id. at 43–44. 
 103. Id. at 44. 
 104. Id. at 50. 
 105. Id. at 49–51. 
 106. Id. at 53–54. 
 107. Id. at 52. 
 108. Id. at 52–53. 
 109. Id. at 53. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 56 n.7. 
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Justice Scalia left “for another day,” however, a complete 
definition of “testimonial,” but stated that “it applies at a minimum 
to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at 
a formal trial and to police interrogations.”112 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist predicted in his concurrence, however, that this lack of 
definition would create uncertainty in future criminal trials.113 His 
prediction was correct, particularly with respect to domestic violence 
cases.114 
B. State v. Davis and Hammon v. State 
After all of the confusion in the lower courts after Crawford, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on two paradigmatic domestic 
violence cases to determine whether 911 calls and police statements 
can be admitted as evidence under the Confrontation Clause. In 
Hammon v. State, two officers arrived at the Hammon home in 
response to a reported domestic disturbance.115 When the officers 
arrived at the scene, the alleged victim, Hammon’s wife, was sitting 
on the front porch.116 The police asked her whether there was a 
problem, and she responded, “No . . . .”117  
After obtaining permission from Hammon’s wife to enter the 
house, the officers found a broken gas-heating unit with fragments 
of glass on the floor and flames emerging from the unit.118 Hammon 
was in the kitchen.119 In response to the officers’ inquiry, he stated 
that there had been an argument, the argument never became 
physical, and everything was now fine.120 One officer remained in the 
kitchen while the other went outside to Hammon’s wife.121 
                                                
 112. Id. at 68. 
 113. See id. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 114. After Crawford, some courts categorically decided that excited utterances or 
spontaneous statements can never be testimonial. See, e.g., People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 
875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004); People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2004). The majority of courts opted to apply a case-by-case approach to determine whether 
911 calls and police statements are testimonial. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 811 
(Minn. 2005), vacated, 548 U.S. 923 (2006). 
 115. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446–47 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 446–47. 
 118. Id. at 447. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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The second officer approached Hammon’s wife and asked her 
again what had happened.122 He later testified that she said that she 
and her husband had gotten into an argument, her husband had 
broken many things, and her husband had gotten physical with her, 
including pushing her into the ground and shoving her face in the 
heater glass.123 Hammon’s wife then, at the officer’s request, filled 
out a battery affidavit and included her allegations of abuse.124 
The state charged Hammon with domestic battery and violation 
of probation.125 His wife was not present for the hearing, but the 
trial court admitted her statements to the police as an excited 
utterance, and the court admitted her affidavit as a statement of 
present sense impression.126 Hammon was convicted.127 His wife 
wrote a letter to the court with respect to Hammon’s sentencing and 
stated that she wanted him to receive counseling and to attend 
Alcoholics Anonymous.128 She also requested that the court place 
Hammon on probation so that he could continue to work and help 
the family financially and so that he could continue to help with the 
care of the children.129 Hammon’s wife claimed that she did not feel 
threatened by Hammon’s presence; she just wanted him to get help 
with his drinking.130 The court sentenced Hammon to one year in 
jail, with all but twenty days suspended.131 Applying Crawford, the 
state court of appeals affirmed the conviction.132 The Supreme Court 
of Indiana determined that the oral statements Hammon’s wife made 
to the police were admissible,133 but rejected the court of appeals’ 
determination that a statement that qualifies as an excited utterance 
is necessarily non-testimonial.134  
                                                
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. The trial court’s determination was made pre-Crawford. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 448 n.3. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 447. 
 132. Id. at 448. 
 133. In contrast, the court determined that Amy’s affidavit was testimonial and 
inadmissible, although its admission by the lower court was harmless error. Id. at 458. 
 134. Id. at 453. 
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In State v. Davis, Michelle McCottry called 911 and then hung 
up.135 The 911 operator called McCottry back, and McCottry 
informed her, “He’s here jumpin’ on me again.”136 The operator 
then asked to whom McCottry was referring, what his relationship 
was to McCottry, and whether the alleged perpetrator had been 
drinking.137 McCottry identified her ex-boyfriend, Davis, as the 
perpetrator, accused him of beating her, and stated that Davis had 
left the scene and that she had a protective order against him.138 
Police officers arrived at McCottry’s home shortly thereafter and 
noted that she was upset and that she had fresh injuries on her 
forearm and face.139 
The police officers were the state’s only witnesses at trial.140 
McCottry did not testify.141 Because the officers could not testify 
regarding the cause of McCottry’s injuries, the only evidence linking 
the injuries to Davis were the statements from McCottry’s 911 
call.142 The tape was admitted as an excited utterance, despite the 
defendant’s Confrontation Clause objection.143 Davis was found 
guilty.144 Applying Roberts, the state court of appeals affirmed the 
guilty verdict, determining that the trial court properly classified the 
call as an excited utterance, a firmly rooted hearsay exception.145 
Applying Crawford and using a case-by-case analysis, the 
Washington Supreme Court determined that while portions of 
McCottry’s 911 call may have been testimonial, the portion 
identifying Davis as the perpetrator was non-testimonial and, 
therefore, had been properly admitted.146 
The facts in both Hammon and Davis are extremely compelling. 
Without knowing the whole story, one could interpret Hammon as a 
case involving a woman who is involved in a violent relationship, but 
                                                
 135. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 846 (Wash. 2005), aff’d, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 846. 
 138. Id. at 846–47. 
 139. Id. at 847. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. This decision took place pre-Crawford. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 851. The court further stated that any error in admitting the testimonial 
portions of the 911 call were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
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who is afraid to involve the authorities in her situation. Part of her 
fear may be that her husband will subject her to further violence. 
Part of her may also fear that her family will become destitute should 
her husband go to jail.147 Regardless of the reason, Hammon’s wife 
may have initially felt reticent to tell the police about the abuse, and, 
having finally made a statement, she may later have refused to testify 
at trial because she was nervous about the possible consequences for 
herself and her family. The reality is that many women feel trapped 
in violent relationships because they fear for their physical safety and 
because they have limited economic resources.148 
One could interpret Davis, on the other hand, as the common 
story of the woman who does try to leave, but who is continually 
harassed by her batterer. Although she went through the steps of 
obtaining a protective order, her ex-boyfriend ignored it and 
subjected her to further violence.149 Out of fear of further physical 
repercussions, she packed up her things and fled the jurisdiction, 
unable to help prosecutors.150 This scenario rings true for many 
women trying to escape the dangers of a violent relationship.151 
The compelling nature of these stories explains why courts are 
reluctant to exclude out-of-court statements that seem essential to 
prosecuting domestic violence perpetrators. Yet despite this 
understandable reaction, Davis v. Washington limited the use of 
these statements in future domestic violence cases.152 
As in Crawford, Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Although Crawford stated that police interrogations are testimonial, 
the Court in Davis intended to determine “more precisely which 
police interrogations produce testimony.”153 First, the Court 
determined that the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial 
statements.154 The Court then held that “[s]tatements are 
                                                
 147. See Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 448 n.3 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis 
v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 148. See infra Part IV. 
 149. See Davis, 111 P.3d at 846–47. 
 150. See Brief of Petitioner at 8, State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, No. 05-5224 (Wash. 
2005), 2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 202. 
 151. See infra Part IV. 
 152. Davis, 547 U.S. 813. Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444, was included in this 
decision. 
 153. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 154. Id. at 825–26. Specifically, the Court was not aware of any early American case that 
involved the Confrontation Clause and testimonial evidence was not involved. Id. at 824. It 
also noted that with the exception of White v. Illinois, cases applying Roberts “never in practice 
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nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation 
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency.”155 In contrast, statements are testimonial when “the 
circumstances indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency and 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”156 
Applying this test to the facts, the Court determined that 
McCottry’s identification of Davis was nontestimonial.157 Justice 
Scalia stated, “A 911 call . . . and at least the initial interrogation 
conducted in connection with a 911 call, is ordinarily not designed 
primarily to ‘establish or prove’ some past fact, but to describe 
current circumstances requiring police assistance.”158 He determined 
that rather than describing past events, McCottry spoke about events 
as they occurred.159 In addition, he noted that she called for help 
against a “bona fide physical threat” and that the “nature of what 
was asked and answered” objectively showed that the statements 
elicited were necessary to resolve an ongoing emergency, not to learn 
about past events.160 McCottry’s tone was frantic, and Justice Scalia 
stated that Davis’ identity was necessary to help the police determine 
whether they were dealing with a violent felon.161 Thus, Justice Scalia 
determined that unlike Sylvia Crawford’s ex parte statements, which 
“aligned perfectly with their courtroom analogues . . . [n]o ‘witness’ 
goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help.”162 
In contrast, Justice Scalia determined that in Hammon it was 
clear from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of an 
investigation into possible criminal conduct.163 He found that the 
interrogation took place in somewhat formal circumstances that bore 
                                                                                                           
dispensed with the Confrontation Clause requirements of unavailability and prior cross-
examination in cases that involved testimonial hearsay.” Id.  
 155. Id. at 822. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 819. 
 158. Id. at 827. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 828. Justice Scalia noted that a statement can start off as a cry for help and 
then become testimonial. For example, after Davis left the scene, McCottry’s statements 
arguably became testimonial. Id. at 828–29. 
 163. Id. at 829. 
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“striking resemblance” to civil law ex parte examinations.164 
Specifically, the police officer questioned Amy Hammon in a separate 
room, away from her husband who tried to intervene in the 
conversation.165 In addition, Amy recounted past events, and her 
statement took place sometime after the events in question.166 In 
other words, as far as Justice Scalia was concerned, her statement was 
a substitute for live testimony.167 For these reasons, her statements 
were testimonial.168 
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in Davis and 
dissented from the Court’s resolution of Hammon on the ground 
that neither involved the type of evidence that was historically 
targeted by the Confrontation Clause.169 Specifically, the 
Confrontation Clause was intended to target ex parte questioning 
under English bail and committal statutes under Queen Mary, and 
he stressed the requirement of solemnity such as in affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.170 
Justice Thomas also criticized Davis for being unpredictable.171 
He specifically criticized the dichotomy created between responding 
to emergency situations and gathering evidence since the police 
often have multiple motives for questioning an individual.172 Thus, it 
may be difficult to determine the primary purpose of an 
interrogation.173 For example, it is possible that the primary purpose 
of the police officer in Hammon was to determine whether Amy was 
in danger of further abuse.174 
Justice Thomas’ analysis is apt in that the dichotomy between 
cries for help and bearing witness in contemplation of legal 
proceedings is somewhat arbitrary and false. Where does one end 
and the other begin? In the real world, these two events often 
happen simultaneously. As Deborah Tuerkheimer explains: 
                                                
 164. Id. at 830. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 170. Id. at 836–37. 
 171. Id. at 834. 
 172. Id. at 839. 
 173. Id. at 834. 
 174. Id. at 841. 
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A domestic violence victim’s safety may be wholly contingent on 
her communication with police her “narration of events” linked 
inexorably to resolving—however temporarily—the danger posed 
by her batterer . . . . The “cry for help” may sound, then, much like 
a narration of events because it is; a victim is describing battering 
that will, in all likelihood, continue in the absence of some action 
by law enforcement . . . . The exigency the victim experiences 
requires a narration of past events in order to resolve the immediate 
danger they precipitated. In short, the meaning of ‘exigency’ to a 
victim of domestic violence is different than it is to victims of other 
types of crime. This reality fatally undermines judicial reasoning 
predicated on the “crying for help” versus “providing information 
to law enforcement” rubric.175 
In the case of McCottry, she called the police in order to seek 
immediate protection from Davis.176 At the same time, however, 
after Davis left, she informed the 911 operator that he was in 
violation of his protective order.177 Thus, in addition to seeking 
immediate protection from the police, one could assume that 
McCottry also was seeking legal proceedings with respect to Davis’ 
violation of the protective order. If Davis was arrested and 
prosecuted for this violation, she presumably would have temporary 
safety from future abuse. 
Similarly, as Justice Thomas noted, it is highly likely that the 
police officer in Hammon was just as concerned about Amy’s 
immediate safety as he was about gathering evidence for trial.178 In 
addition, it is possible that Amy still felt in danger of her husband 
even after the police arrived, and, therefore, the emergency remained 
ongoing.179 
The most glaring omission in Davis’ analysis, however, is a 
discussion about the government producing evidence in domestic 
violence trials. In Crawford, Justice Scalia seemed to be particularly 
concerned about this potential for prosecutorial abuse.180 Because of 
                                                
 175. Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 5, at 23–25; see also Tuerkheimer, 
Exigency, supra note 8 (critiquing the Court’s analysis of exigency in the domestic violence 
context). 
 176. Davis, 547 U.S. at 831. 
 177. State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 846 (Wash. 2005), aff’d, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 178. Id. at 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 179. Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 5. 
 180. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004); see also Kenneth Graham, The 
Revolution Revised: A Guided Tour of Davis v. Washington, 2006 UCLA PUB. L. SERIES, Paper 
6-07, at 21–22; Michael H. Graham, Special Report: Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 
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the widespread institution of mandatory arrest and mandatory 
prosecution policies, it is safe to assume that once police respond to a 
potential domestic violence incident, they immediately begin 
collecting evidence for trial, even from the initial inquiry at the 
scene. The police in most jurisdictions begin this investigation 
assuming that the victim will not testify at trial.181 Thus, the police 
take greater care to both document the demeanor of the victim at 
the scene and record court-admissible statements.182 
Post-Crawford, the American Prosecutor’s Research Institute 
created a list of predicate questions for the express purpose of 
enlisting the police in gathering statements that would survive 
Crawford.183 These questions purported to help the police avoid the 
appearance that the statements were the product of an 
interrogation.184 Thus, as Myrna Raeder states: “It is fairly 
disingenuous to claim that the officer doesn’t know a prosecution is 
likely to occur when the jurisdiction has a pro or mandatory arrest 
policy in domestic violence cases.”185 
There is no reason to believe that this sophisticated preparation 
of domestic violence cases will not continue post-Davis. It is true 
that this practice is well intended to increase the number of 
convicted perpetrators. Nevertheless, this practice involves the type 
of “evil” that Scalia was most concerned about regarding 
confrontation rights: the government’s involvement in producing 
evidence for trial. For lower courts to stay true to the spirit of 
Crawford, and presumably Davis, many out-of-court statements 
                                                                                                           
S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004), 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 4, n.10–11 (2006); Michael L. 
Seigel & Daniel Weisman, The Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements in a Post-Crawford 
World, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 877, 890 (2007). 
 181. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 61, at 1187. 
 182. Id. (citing various jurisdictions where police are trained to gather evidence so that a 
case can be tried without the victim). In fact, the police officers in Hammon followed standard 
protocols that prosecutors recommend for preparing domestic violence cases. See Tracy Bahm, 
DV 101, http://www.ndaa.org/apri/programs/vawa/dv_101.html#preparecase (suggesting 
that law enforcement officers and prosecutors prepare a case as though the victim will not 
testify). They separated the parties involved and conducted the interviews separately. See Bahm, 
supra; see also Luisa Bigornia, Domestic Violence: Alternatives to Traditional Criminal 
Prosecution of Spousal Abuse, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 57, 58–59 (2000) (noting that 
prosecutors in San Diego routinely prosecute cases from evidence obtained from the police and 
that they have a special form for recording the victim’s demeanor and statements). 
 183. See Sample Crawford Predicate Questions, 1 THE VOICE 8 (2004), available at 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/the_voice_vol_1_issue_1.pdf. 
 184. See id. 
 185. Raeder, supra note 65, at 340. 
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made to police officers at the scene of domestic violence incidents 
should not be admissible at trial unless the victim has been subject to 
cross-examination. Furthermore, it is possible that many 911 
statements also should not be admissible if 911 operators have been 
trained to gather evidence for trial. 
III. RECONSIDERING THE USE OF VICTIMLESS PROSECUTIONS 
An honest reading of Crawford suggests that many out-of-court 
statements should no longer be admissible in domestic violence trials 
because of the sophisticated manner in which this evidence is 
produced. Yet, a limitation on victimless prosecutions is not 
necessarily a setback in the development of effective domestic 
violence laws and policy. Indeed, a nondiscriminatory use of 
victimless prosecutions may not be in the best interest of all domestic 
violence victims. While the purpose of these types of prosecutions is 
clearly to protect women, a nondiscriminatory use of these 
prosecutions may also disempower women in ways that undermine 
the original reasons that participants of the women’s movement 
desired the involvement of the criminal justice system in domestic 
violence in the first place. In other words, the goal of successful 
prosecutions may have eclipsed the original goals of the women’s 
movement. 
As previously discussed, there has been a great deal of scholarship 
on the effectiveness of mandatory arrest and mandatory prosecution 
policies.186 There has been little discussion, however, about the 
                                                
 186. See supra Part I. For further discussion of these policies, see generally Deborah 
Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, 
Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3 (1999) [hereinafter Epstein, Effective 
Intervention] (suggesting that prosecutors, judges, and courts consider their role in improving 
the criminal justice response to domestic violence), Deborah Epstein et al., Prioritizing 
Victims’ Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 465 (2003) (advocating “prosecution in context” to maximize the 
government’s responsiveness to an individual’s context in order to improve her long-time 
safety without jeopardizing existing efforts under mandatory policies to keep batterers 
accountable), Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic 
Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843 (2002) (arguing that current domestic violence 
policies, including mandatory policies, should be reassessed to consider procedural justice with 
respect to defendants), G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic 
Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237 
(2005) (discussing how proponents of mandatory policies have conservatized the battered 
women’s movement and dislocated them from their feminist origin), Sack, supra note 39, at 
1657 (arguing that we should acknowledge and correct the shortcomings in the criminal 
justice system’s response to domestic violence without abandoning its achievements), and 
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effectiveness of victimless prosecutions in the domestic violence 
context. It is my hope that this Article will encourage this dialogue. 
Specifically, scholars need to reevaluate whether a nondiscriminatory 
use of victimless prosecutions furthers or hinders the goals of 
keeping women physically, emotionally, and mentally safe and of 
deconstructing certain legal and political structures that encourage 
the subordination of women. 
To be clear, there are occasions when prosecuting a case without 
the victim is not only helpful, but necessary. The most obvious 
example of this type of circumstance is the prosecution of homicide 
cases. In all homicide cases, the victim is not available to participate 
in the murderer’s prosecution. Yet, prosecutors must proceed with 
their prosecutions using evidence other than the victim’s live 
testimony. In addition, some commentators argue that victimless 
prosecutions may be necessary in cases where children are victims of 
sexual assault, because the prosecution process may be too traumatic 
for those children.187 
A discussion on the merits of victimless prosecutions in every 
type of criminal case is beyond the scope of this Article. I want to 
acknowledge, however, that there are occasions when these types of 
prosecutions are necessary and useful and that there may even be 
some occasions when they are necessary and useful in certain 
domestic violence cases.188 For example, as I will discuss further in 
Section A, if a woman chooses not to testify because she has been 
threatened with retaliatory violence, the forfeiture doctrine probably 
allows her out-of-court statements to be admissible at trial.189 
Victimless prosecutions in this context make sense. 
Nevertheless, there are reasons other than just fear of retaliation 
that domestic violence victims choose not to testify, including a lack 
of material resources, lack of adequate protection from the legal 
system when they do testify, and lack of quality interactions with 
                                                                                                           
Donna Wills, Mandatory Prosecution in Domestic Violence Cases: Domestic Violence: The Case for 
Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 173 (1997) (arguing that “no drop” policies 
are an enlightened approach to domestic violence prosecutions). 
 187. See Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation Clause, 
81 NEB. L. REV. 1258, 1280–85 (2003); Richard D. Friedman, Grappling With the Meaning of 
“Testimonial,” 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 272 (2005). 
 188. Indeed the forfeiture doctrine may apply to certain domestic violence cases. For 
further discussion of the forfeiture doctrine, see infra Part III.A. 
 189. See infra Part III.A. 
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actors in the criminal justice system.190 For this reason, I caution 
against the nondiscriminatory use of this practice in the domestic 
violence context. There is no empirical evidence that women who do 
not testify are physically safer191 than women who do. Given this fact, 
a nondiscriminatory use of victimless prosecutions is particularly 
problematic if it is indeed true that victimless prosecutions encourage 
the systematic silence and disempowerment of women. 
A. Are Women Really Safer When They Do Not Testify? 
The potential silencing of women encouraged by victimless 
prosecutions is particularly disturbing because it is not clear that 
women are always safer when they do not testify. I do not question 
whether one of the original intentions of victimless prosecutions was 
to keep women safe. As has already been discussed, there are those 
who believe that prosecuting batterers makes women safer.192 
Moreover, some commentators and scholars believe that victimless 
prosecutions allow these prosecutions to continue, while protecting 
women from violence in retaliation for their testimony.193  
Women who choose not to testify because they have been 
threatened with retaliation from their batterers, however, already 
have protection under the forfeiture doctrine. Justice Scalia made it 
clear in both Crawford and Davis that this exception to the 
Confrontation Clause still exists.194 The forfeiture doctrine is an 
equitable doctrine under which a defendant is deemed to waive his 
or her confrontation rights if the declarant is unavailable because of 
the defendant’s wrongdoing.195 Consequently, some commentators 
                                                
 190. See infra Part IV.A. 
 191. One might argue that the victim’s emotional safety is also an important 
consideration in domestic violence cases. As is the case for most victims who must confront the 
perpetrators of their crimes at trial, there will be a certain level of anxiety created by having to 
confront one’s batterer. Improving the victim’s interactions with actors in the criminal justice 
system, however, could potentially decrease this anxiety to a manageable level. For further 
discussion, see infra Part IV.A.3. 
 192. See supra Part I. 
 193. Lininger, supra note 12, at 771. 
 194. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
 195. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–61 (1878) (allowing the out-of-
court testimony of the defendant’s alleged second wife in a bigamy trial where there was 
evidence that the defendant had attempted to hide her during the trial). For cases that discuss 
the forfeiture doctrine in the domestic violence context, see State v. Wright, 726 N.W.2d 464, 
479–82 (Minn. 2007) (remanding the case for a determination of whether the forfeiture 
doctrine applied where there were allegations that the victim did not testify because she was 
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argue that the forfeiture doctrine almost always applies in domestic 
violence cases because the abuse itself prevents women from 
testifying.196  
Scholars should carefully analyze domestic violence cases, 
however, before they determine that it is always the case that victims 
do not testify because of the batterers’ wrongdoing.197 As loathsome 
as domestic abuse is, there is still a constitutional obligation to 
protect the confrontation rights of all defendants.  
Moreover, it is not clear that women are always safer in the long-
term when they do not testify or participate in prosecutions. In order 
for victimless prosecutions to be successful in promoting the long-
term safety of women, one must make one of two assumptions. One 
assumption is that arrest and prosecution deter batterers from future 
violence, and therefore, when the batterer returns to the victim’s 
home, he will no longer abuse her. The other assumption is that the 
arrest and conviction of her batterer allows a victim time to extricate 
herself from a violent relationship and to become permanently safe. 
With respect to the first assumption, as was discussed earlier, the 
evidence is inconclusive on whether arrest deters future violence 
from batterers.198 While some statistics suggest that no-drop 
prosecution policies decrease the level of violence against women,199 
                                                                                                           
concerned for her safety and because the defendant threatened her from jail), State v. Tyler, 
155 P.3d 1002, 1007 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to apply the forfeiture doctrine in a 
domestic violence case because the state failed to preserve the error for appeal), and State v. 
Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 325–26 (W. Va. 2006) (remanding for a determination of whether 
the forfeiture doctrine applied in a domestic violence case). 
 196. See Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle, supra note 5, at 9 (stating that “in most 
abusive relationships, ‘tampering’ conduct is inexorably bound up in the violent exercise of 
power that is itself criminal”). But see Joan Comparet-Cassani, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1185, 
1211 (2005) (arguing that the wrongful act must have been committed with the intention of 
making the witness unavailable to testify at the defendant’s trial). 
 197. Of course, but for the batterer’s actions, there would be no prosecution and no 
need for the victim to testify in the first place. But beyond this causal connection, there may be 
other more direct reasons why a victim does not testify. For example, evidence suggests that 
some victims do not testify because of poor interactions with actors in the criminal justice 
system. For more discussion regarding reasons why domestic violence victims do not testify, 
see infra Part IV. 
 198. See supra Part I. But see Tuerkheimer, Exigency, supra note 8, at 801 (arguing that 
the investigation of a domestic violence crime and the ensuing arrest are the only way to 
prevent injury to the victim in the midst of a violent act). 
 199. The level of nonfatal violent crimes against women dropped from 1.1 million in 
1993 to 588,490 in 2001. Rennison, supra note 11. Proponents of no-drop policies in San 
Diego credit the policy for decreasing the number of homicides from thirty in 1985 to seven in 
1994. Gina L. Durham, The Domestic Violence Dilemma: How Our Ineffective and Varied 
Responses Reflect Our Conflicted Views of the Problem, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 641, 651 (1998). 
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other evidence suggests that, while no-drop policies may lower 
dismissal rates and increase the number of domestic violence cases 
that are prosecuted, prosecution does not necessarily reduce 
recidivism.200 Moreover, because domestic violence incidents are 
underreported, it is unclear how much violence women actually 
experience under mandatory polices.201  
With respect to the latter assumption, most women must make 
several attempts to leave a relationship before they succeed.202 Thus, 
even if a woman wants to leave a violent relationship, it is often very 
difficult. First, batterers are most often punished with nothing more 
than probation or short jail time.203 For this reason, women have 
very little time to escape before their batterers are back on the street 
or back in their homes.  
Furthermore, separation may increase the instigation of 
violence.204 According to Martha Mahoney, “[a]t least half of women 
who leave their abusers are followed and harassed or further 
attacked. In one study of interspousal homicide, more than half of 
the men who killed their spouses did so when the partners were 
separated.”205 
In addition, many domestic violence victims do not have the 
economic resources to live on their own, and therefore, must rely on 
their batterers for their basic needs.206 Many women cannot afford to 
leave their batterers. 
Finally, there is no empirical evidence that shows that 
prosecuting these cases without the victims’ involvement or 
testimony makes women safer from further abuse. Further research 
                                                
 200. See Coker, supra note 39, at 817–18 (“[O]f those studies [analyzing prosecution’s 
effects on recidivism] that exist, several find that no particular outcome of prosecution is 
significantly related to recidivism.”); Mills, supra note 18, at 567–68 (“A recent study on the 
effects of prosecution on recidivism presented striking results[—]that prosecution had no effect 
on the likelihood of re-arrest of the batterer within a six-month period.”); Sack, supra note 39, 
at 1681. 
 201. Mahoney, supra note 14, at 11. 
 202. Id. at 63. 
 203. Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic 
Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1508, 1521–22 (1998) (“Of those cases that are 
prosecuted, many are charged or pled down to misdemeanors despite facts that suggest the 
conduct constituted a felony.”). “[G]ender bias task force reports indicate that judges impose 
lighter sentences on defendants convicted of domestic violence crimes than [on] those [who 
commit violence] against strangers.” Epstein, Effective Intervention, supra note 186, at 43. 
 204. Mahoney, supra note 14, at 65. 
 205. Id. at 64–65. 
 206. See infra Part IV.A. 
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needs to be conducted on this issue, and specifically, scholars should 
research whether the victims’ participation in the prosecution process 
may actually improve their level of safety in the long term. 
B. Are Victimless Prosecutions Encouraging the Systematic Silence of 
Women? 
Under current practice, many domestic violence victims need not 
speak at all within the criminal justice system, other than through the 
statements they make in a 911 call or in a police statement. Without 
further communication with these women, however, the context of 
their experiences remains unknown. For example, how often has the 
woman been battered by this perpetrator? Does she have the 
resources to remove herself from the violence? Is the woman 
separated from the perpetrator, or has she attempted to leave the 
perpetrator in the past? Is the woman an immigrant or a woman of 
color? All of these questions are potentially relevant in determining 
the amount of danger the woman faces, the likelihood she has of 
gaining safety in the future, and the reasons she has become a victim 
of domestic abuse in the first place.207 
Because these statements lack context, therefore, one might 
argue that victimless prosecutions encourage the legal silence of 
women. First, they are most obviously silent by not testifying and 
speaking out against their batterers. But even more importantly, it 
increases their silence within the discourse on the domestic violence 
laws and policies that are supposed to help them.208 
My concern about silencing is obviously not relevant in the 
victimless prosecutions of homicide cases. In addition, there may be 
other contexts where the benefits of victimless prosecutions 
outweigh any harm that is caused by the silence of the victim. For 
example, assuming that there are no Confrontation Clause 
violations, any potential harm caused by the silence of child victims 
                                                
 207. See supra Part I.D and infra Part IV.A. 
 208. Of course, the legal process is not the only forum where domestic violence victims’ 
voices may be heard. Victims also can engage in policy discourse through the political process. 
For example, they can host rallies, write their legislators, and lobby Congress. The political and 
legal processes are not mutually exclusive, however, and both are important in creating change. 
In addition, one wonders how willing victims will be to engage in the political process if their 
initial interactions with legal actors during the investigative and prosecution process are 
negative. See infra note 209. Finally, it seems unlikely that women will be willing to participate 
in the political process if they are not first willing to speak out against their batterer in a public 
setting like a trial. 
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of sexual assaults may be outweighed by the potential emotional 
harms that these children might suffer if they testify. 
The systematic silence of domestic violence victims, however, is 
troubling because most of these victims are women, and women 
historically have been politically and legally subordinate and silent in 
our society. As discussed in greater detail in this Section, the legal 
silencing of subordinated groups is especially significant because it 
reinforces the disempowerment and marginalization that these 
groups already experience.  
Some commentators might argue that, as is the case with child 
victims of sexual assault, the traumatic experience and possible 
dangerous repercussions of testifying outweigh any potential harm 
caused by silence. While this might be the case for some victims of 
domestic violence, particularly for women who are in extreme danger 
of physical retaliation, there are still women who do not necessarily 
require this type of protection.209 As adults, women do not require 
the same type of protection as children. Indeed, equating women to 
children undermines their goal of social, political, and legal equality 
with men. For this reason, we need to closely examine when 
victimless prosecutions are necessary and when victim participation 
can plausibly be encouraged. 
Focusing on the silencing of defendants in the criminal legal 
system, Alexandra Natapoff notes that there is a phenomenon of 
legal silencing of subordinated groups.210 This phenomenon is 
problematic because being heard within the legal process can be an 
important part of the larger power struggle of social meaning.211 
“Discourse—the way things are talked about—is an exercise in 
                                                
 209. According to experts, many domestic violence victims do not testify because of a 
lack of material resources and a lack of quality interactions with actors in the criminal justice 
system, not simply fear of retaliation from the batterer. See infra Part IV. In addition, it may be 
that certain changes within the criminal justice system could provide better protection for 
victims. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 210. Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1449, 1452–53 (2005); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: 
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991) (discussing how poverty law 
clients are often silenced within the attorney-client relationship); Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the 
Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 533 (1992) (discussing how the poor are silenced in Baltimore’s rent courts); Mari J. 
Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last 
Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) (arguing that accent discrimination is a form of 
racial subordination). 
 211. Natapoff, supra note 210, at 1453. 
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power.”212 As Catharine MacKinnon has stated, “the less speech you 
have, the more the speech of those who have it keeps you 
unequal.”213 
Speaking, therefore, has value as a form of self-expression, 
recognition, and participation.214 When individuals do not have 
speech, they are ignored, which leads to their disempowerment. 
Furthermore, when certain viewpoints are not heard, we cannot be 
sure that the legal system is truly effective. For these reasons, 
encouraging the silence of domestic violence victims encourages 
their complicity in their subordination not only by their batterers, 
but also by the legal system. With respect to victimless prosecutions, 
three important issues need to be explored: whether domestic 
violence victims are ignored by the criminal legal system, whether 
more speech could lead to more effective domestic violence laws and 
policy, and whether silent domestic violence victims are complicit 
with their subordination. 
1. Are domestic violence victims ignored? 
In her discussion on defendant silencing, Natapoff refers to 
classic themes of free speech.215 One of these classic themes is that 
free speech is a prerequisite for participatory democracy and self-
governance.216 In order to be responsive to the will of the people, 
the government must allow for “free political discussion.”217 Free 
speech allows individuals “to participate in and shape the public 
debate.”218 
Another scholar, Kimberle Crenshaw, specifically discusses how 
women of color are left out of the public debate within the domestic 
violence context.219 According to Crenshaw, the needs of women of 
color are ignored because their experiences are silenced within the 
discourse of domestic violence law and policy.220 She notes that 
antiracist politics suppress discussion of domestic violence within 
                                                
 212. Id. at 1490–91. 
 213. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 72 (1993). 
 214. Natapoff, supra note 210, at 1475. 
 215. Id. at 1487–91. 
 216. Id. at 1488. 
 217. Id. at 1488–89 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)). 
 218. Id. at 1489. 
 219. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). 
 220. Id. 
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nonwhite communities.221 For example, some African-Americans 
suppress discussion of domestic violence within their own 
community out of fears of perpetuating the stereotype that African-
American men are violent.222 Likewise, in an attempt to stress the 
fact that domestic violence occurs in white middle-class and upper-
class communities, commentators focus on these women’s 
experiences and silence the needs and experiences of women of 
color.223 As a result, women of color are marginalized and 
disempowered.224 In other words, when individuals are silenced, they 
are ignored.  
While Crenshaw focuses on the silencing of women of color in 
the domestic violence context, it is possible that the practice of 
victimless prosecutions encourages the silence of all women who do 
not testify. It is easy to see how domestic violence victims may be 
ignored (whether intentionally or not) within victimless 
prosecutions. Once the prosecutor has the victim’s statement, she is 
no longer needed to complete the prosecution, and the process can 
continue without her. Indeed, some prosecutors might prefer it that 
way because it can be difficult for prosecutors to get domestic 
violence victims to cooperate fully and easily in the prosecution of 
their batterers.225 In addition, some prosecutors may believe that the 
prosecution will be more successful without the victim because juries 
may find a victim less credible if she does not fit their mental 
stereotypes of a domestic violence victim.226 Thus, a 
nondiscriminatory use of victimless prosecutions in the domestic 
violence context is quite tempting to the prosecutor because it 
arguably makes prosecutions of batterers more attainable. 
The problem with the wholesale use of victimless prosecutions, 
however, is that the victim is literally removed from the criminal 
justice process, and her needs and experiences become irrelevant to 
                                                
 221. Id. at 1256. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 1258–62. 
 224. Id. at 1241–45. 
 225. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 226. See Busching, supra note 45, at 396 n.17; Laurie S. Kohn, Barriers to Reliable 
Credibility Assessments: Domestic Violence Victim-Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 733, 743–44 (2003) (noting how domestic violence victims are multi-faceted individuals 
who may not fit the stereotype of being helpless, passive, and fearful). Ironically, limiting the 
“type” of domestic violence victim that makes it to the stand perpetuates jurors’ stereotypical 
images of domestic violence victims. 
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the goal of prosecuting the batterer. Whether prosecution is in the 
victim’s best interest and what effect the prosecution might have on 
the victim are no longer the concern of the legal system. 
It is true that prosecutors have always had the discretion to 
prosecute a case regardless of the wishes of the victim. Indeed, 
prosecutors represent the state’s interests, not necessarily just those 
of the victim.227 The consideration of the victims’ wishes in domestic 
violence cases seems most urgent, however. A victim of domestic 
violence is in more danger than the typical assault victim because she 
is in an ongoing relationship with her assailant. Therefore, she is at 
greater risk of future violence by this assailant.228 For this reason, it 
makes sense to consider the opinions of domestic violence victims in 
determining the best ways to keep them safe, even if this opinion is 
not always determinative.  
In addition, from a self-governance perspective, a legitimate legal 
system should want to hear from these women.229 Not only should 
these women have a voice in how domestic violence laws and policies 
benefit and protect them, but they should also have a voice in 
determining when prosecution is in their best interest. Otherwise, 
these women are disempowered from participating in a legal system 
that is supposed to help them, and they are subordinated by a legal 
system that ignores them.  
2. Does speech lead to effective policy? 
Another classic theme of free speech is that free speech leads to 
truth in the “marketplace of ideas.”230 In other words, free speech 
“plays an important role in permitting social truths to emerge . . . 
silencing voices within that ‘marketplace’ impedes rigorous inquiry 
into truth. By extension, when viewpoints are excluded from the 
public debate, it undermines confidence in the conclusions.”231 
                                                
 227. See the discussion of Cheryl Hanna’s views on mandatory policies supra Part I.C.3 
for a description of the state’s interests in domestic violence cases. 
 228. See supra Part II.A. 
 229. Cf. Natapoff, supra note 210, at 1480–90 (arguing that a legitimate criminal system 
would include an opportunity for expressive participation from defendants). 
 230. In discussing the First Amendment, Justice Holmes said that “the ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 231. Natapoff, supra note 210, at 1487. 
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The silence of domestic violence victims’ voices within the 
criminal justice system, encouraged by victimless prosecutions, is 
problematic because we need these women’s experiences to test and 
improve upon the effectiveness of our laws and policies. Elizabeth 
Schneider argues that feminist theory rests on the “notion that 
women’s experience is the central starting point of theory.”232 
“[T]heory flows from experience in the world, and then theory 
refines and modifies that experience.”233 Schneider emphasizes “the 
need for close attention to the interrelationship between theory and 
practice in our experience of the complexity of women’s lives and in 
the articulation of women’s experiences into legal claims.”234 She also 
stresses that feminist theoretical work must be both particular in 
documenting women’s experiences and general in “linking violence 
against women to women’s subordination in society and to more 
general social problems of abuse of power and control.”235 She warns 
that the theoretical framework must be expanded to avoid essentialist 
thinking because in reality “battered women are not similarly 
situated.”236 
In this same vein, Martha Mahoney discusses the 
interrelationship between women’s lives, culture, and law: 
This relationship is not linear (moving from women’s lives to law, 
or from law to life) but interactive: cultural assumptions about 
domestic violence affect substantive law and methods of litigation 
in ways that in turn affect society’s perceptions of women; both law 
and societal perceptions affect women’s understanding of our own 
lives, relationships, and options; our lives are part of the culture 
that affects legal interpretation and within which further legal 
moves are made. Serious harm to women results from the ways in 
which law and culture distort our experience.237 
In other words, to be effective, domestic laws and policies need 
to be in constant interaction and dialogue with the real life 
experiences of women. This dialogue will provide more information 
about what women need from these laws and policies in order to 
keep them safe. We also are better able to see which current policies 
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are working and which policies are actually perpetuating gender 
subordination and violence. Moreover, we may find that some 
policies might be good for some women, but not good for others. 
By changing these laws and policies to better reflect the experiences 
of all women, we can change how domestic violence victims and 
women are generally perceived. We can stop seeing domestic 
violence victims as a faceless stereotype and begin understanding the 
complexities of domestic violence that affect women from all races, 
cultures, and income levels. Victimless prosecutions limit the 
likelihood that this dialogue takes place because they remove victims 
from the process and they encourage silence.238 This silence limits 
the effectiveness of domestic violence policy because it responds to a 
potentially limited view of the real experiences of women. 
3. Are silent domestic violence victims complicit with their 
subordination? 
Dorothy Roberts argues that silence can make one complicit with 
one’s subordination.239 As an example, she discusses how the legal 
system silences African-American welfare mothers as a “part of a 
ritual of humiliation by the bureaucrats who supervise them.”240 If a 
woman tries to defend her spending habits during a hearing, she 
risks being cut off from benefits.241 This system punishes these 
women when they speak; thus, they must assume a submissive stance 
in order not to offend those who have power over them.242 This 
silence is undoubtedly an act of survival. Yet because it also 
perpetuates the welfare mothers’ submissiveness to government 
bureaucrats, this silence makes these women complicit with their 
subordination. 
Similarly, women of color who refuse medical treatment are 
often ignored by judges and doctors because they do not use the 
                                                
 238. Cf. Bezdek, supra note 210, at 533–42 (arguing that Baltimore rent courts fail the 
poor because they are institutionally silenced); Natapoff, supra note 210, at 1488 (arguing that 
criminal defendants’ voices are significant in determining the efficiencies and inefficiencies of 
the criminal process as well as its claims of fairness). 
 239. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Paradox of Silence: Some Questions About Silence as 
Resistance, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 343, 355–56 (2000) (responding to Professor Margaret 
Montoya’s Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal & Centrifugal Forces in Legal 
Communication, Pedagogy, and Resources, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 263 (2000)). 
 240. Roberts, supra note 239, at 347–49. 
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dominant medical language.243 Roberts cites Rayna Rapp’s study that 
described African-American women who declined amniocentesis. 
They often explained their decisions in “terms of nonmedical systems 
of interpreting their pregnancies, including religion, visions, and folk 
healing.”244 Another study cited by Roberts examined cases where 
court orders for involuntary cesareans were sought.245 Eighty-one 
percent of the cases studied involved women of color.246 Like the 
women in Rapp’s study, some of these women explained their 
reasons for not wanting the surgery in nonmedical terms.247 Yet 
“[j]udges and doctors often dismiss these explanations not expressed 
in the dominant medical language as illegitimate.”248 Although these 
women actually did use their voices, the doctors effectively silenced 
them by subordinating the patients’ wishes to those of the 
doctors.249 Roberts explains, “They describe pregnant women of 
color who refuse medical treatment as angry, irrational, fearful, 
stubborn, selfish, and uncooperative. The medical model of 
childbirth interprets these women’s words in a way that justifies the 
doctors’ control.”250  
Finally, Roberts argues that the silence of students of color in the 
classroom may be a form of accommodation of the dominant 
discourse.251 She concludes, 
[S]ilence is often the very objective of subordinating forces. 
Remaining silent in the face of injustice may even turn people into 
accomplices in injustice. Black women’s experience in welfare and 
doctors’ offices shows that silencing is a powerful tool to reinforce 
subordination, while language can be a powerful tool to resist the 
dominant mindset.252 
While the originators of mandatory policies and victimless 
prosecutions did not intend to oppress women, such policies and 
procedures may be subordinating women by encouraging silence. As 
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has already been discussed, participants in the women’s movement 
originally intended mandatory policies to respond to women, and 
specifically to the issue of domestic violence, which the law had 
historically ignored. Yet the frustrations that some legal actors 
express about domestic violence victims being “noncooperative” or 
“irrational” when it comes to the prosecution of their batterers 
sound eerily similar to the criticisms that Roberts cites from 
physicians about the medical wishes of some women of color. This 
striking similarity raises the concern that the silence of women via 
victimless prosecutions will subordinate their needs and experiences 
to the will of the legal system. As a result, the goal of increasing the 
number of arrests and prosecutions of batterers may overpower the 
goals of safety, gender equality, and autonomy. 
Since victimless prosecutions encourage the silence of domestic 
violence victims, we should ask whether this practice encourages 
women to be complicit with their subordination by both their 
batterers and the legal system. By not testifying and speaking out 
against violence, victims arguably are complicit with their batterers’ 
abuse. In addition, by not engaging in an active dialogue with the 
legal system about what they need from domestic violence laws and 
policies, victims arguably are complicit with a legal and political 
system that historically has ignored women in pursuit of its own 
agenda. 
With respect to domestic violence victims of color, Kimberle 
Crenshaw has stated: 
Within communities of color, efforts to stem the politicization of 
domestic violence are often grounded in attempts to maintain the 
integrity of the community. The articulation of this perspective 
takes different forms. Some critics allege that feminism has no place 
within communities of color, that the issues are internally divisive, 
and that they represent the migration of white women’s concerns 
into a context in which they are not only irrelevant but also 
harmful. At its most extreme, this rhetoric denies that gender 
violence is a problem in the community and characterizes any effort 
to politicize gender subordination as itself a community 
problem.253 
 In other words, out of respect for their racial communities, 
women of color are expected to keep silent in the face of domestic 
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violence. They “must weigh their interests in avoiding issues that 
might reinforce distorted public perceptions against the need to 
acknowledge and address intracommunity problems.”254 Many 
African-American women may feel pressure to conceal the violence 
they experience because they want to limit racial stereotyping against 
African-American men.255 Similarly, some Asian women hide the 
violence they experience at home because “saving the honor of the 
family from shame is a priority.”256 Crenshaw points out, however, 
that “this priority tends to be interpreted as obliging women not to 
scream rather than obliging men not to hit.”257 
Women of color also may be hesitant to call the police because 
they do not want to “subject their private lives to the scrutiny and 
control of a police force that is frequently hostile” to people of 
color.258 Crenshaw argues that for members of racially subordinated 
groups, the home may “function as a safe haven from the indignities 
of life in a racist society . . . but for this ‘safe haven,’ in many cases, 
women of color victimized by violence might otherwise seek 
help.”259 
Instead, while women of color stay silent in order to maintain 
the integrity of their respective racial groups, the violence continues. 
By not speaking out against this violence and by not effectively using 
legal remedies to end this violence, these women are being complicit 
in the violence against them. Crenshaw aptly argues that the 
silencing of domestic violence in communities of color must end if 
we are going to adequately address this issue.260 This Article 
contends that complicity from silence occurs among all races of 
women who are victims of domestic violence. 
 In order to end the complicity of women in domestic violence, 
criminal laws and policies need to discourage their silence. By 
participating in the prosecution of her batterer, the victim literally 
and symbolically stands up against her batterer, which may enable 
her to gain the confidence she needs to build a life without abuse. As 
Alafair S. Burke has argued, “participating in the prosecution of a 
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batterer can be a kind of ‘coming out,’ providing confirmation of 
[the victim’s] experiences.”261 In addition, participating in the 
prosecution informs the batterer that he can no longer control the 
victim. Abusers control their victims mentally, not just physically.262 
As long as the abuser mentally controls the victim, the abuse will 
continue.263 Speaking out against the abuse and participating in the 
prosecution of one’s batterer may be an important step in gaining 
control of one’s life. 
Finally, limiting the use of victimless prosecutions forces more 
interaction between the victim and the criminal justice system; this 
interaction limits the system’s ability to subordinate the victim’s 
needs to its own agenda.  
IV. A MORE INCLUSIVE APPROACH 
As stated previously, this Article does not contend that 
prosecution is the right course of action for all domestic violence 
victims. It also does not contend that we should automatically accept 
a substantial reduction in domestic violence prosecutions because of 
Crawford and Davis.264 Instead, if participation in the prosecution 
process can be empowering for victims, perhaps we should look for 
ways to encourage more participation when possible. 
A. Why Don’t Women Testify? 
Evidence suggests that many domestic violence victims are silent 
because the legal system is inadequate in dealing with their cases. 
While fear of retaliation may be one of the reasons that victims do 
                                                
 261. Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative 
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not testify against their batterers,265 other key reasons that they do 
not testify are a lack of material resources, a lack of protection from 
the criminal justice system when they do testify, and a lack of quality 
interactions with the criminal justice system.266 This section discusses 
these reasons in detail and uses Chicago’s TAC program as a model 
for encouraging victim participation. While some may doubt whether 
victim participation in domestic violence prosecutions is realistic, 
Chicago’s TAC program suggests that under the right circumstances, 
victims will be willing to testify against their batterers. 
1. Battered women lack material resources 
Donna Coker argues that women are more vulnerable to 
violence, more accessible to batterers, and do not separate from their 
batterers because of inadequate material resources.267 This lack of 
resources also explains why women do not want to testify in court or 
often recant and testify on behalf of their batterers in court. 
“Women’s decisions whether or not to support criminal intervention 
are often related to whether or not they can afford to prioritize 
prosecution over other more immediate concerns such as food, 
employment, and childcare.”268 When a woman walks away from a 
violent relationship, she faces a fifty percent chance that her standard 
of living will drop below the poverty line.269 Moreover, nearly half of 
all homeless women and children have fled violence in the home.270 
                                                
 265. As has already been discussed, out-of-court statements from women who are in real 
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Remember that Amy Hammon asked the court not to incarcerate 
her husband so that he could continue to provide for their family. 
For many women, the reality is that incarceration of their spouses 
means destitution and homelessness for their families.271  
2. Battered women are not adequately protected 
While the criminal justice system’s response to battered women 
has vastly improved over the years, women still are not necessarily 
safe after they seek its assistance. One of the most common 
misconceptions about domestic violence, and one of the important 
premises of victimless prosecutions, is that separation from an abuser 
equates to safety.272 An attempt to separate from one’s batterer, 
however, can be very dangerous.273 Linda Mills argues that women 
are safest when they willingly partner with state actors to investigate 
and prosecute domestic violence cases.274 Unfortunately, however, 
the criminal justice system sometimes fails to protect these women 
even when they are willing participants. 
 This failure is evident in the story of Evette Cade. After several 
years of abuse from her husband, Cade finally separated from him.275 
Although she filed a protection order, her estranged husband still 
continued to harass and to intimidate Cade, her daughter, and her 
family, and he vandalized her family members’ property.276 Then, 
one day Cade’s husband filed a motion to have the protective order 
removed, claiming that he wanted to save his marriage through 
counseling.277 
On the day of the hearing on Cade’s husband’s motion, Cade 
showed up, but her husband did not.278 Nevertheless, the judge 
decided to continue with the hearing.279 Cade attempted to explain 
how her husband had been violating the protective order and how 
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she felt in danger.280 She also tried to show the judge pictures that 
evidenced his vandalism.281 The judge would not listen to her, 
however, and when Cade expressed that she wanted to get an 
immediate divorce, he replied, sarcastically, “Well, I’d like to be 6-
foot-5, but that’s not what we do here. You have to go to the 
divorce court for that.”282 Cade continued to try to explain how her 
husband was violating the protective order.283 The judge cut her off, 
removed the protective order, and perfunctorily stated, “This case is 
dismissed at the request of the petitioner.”284 Three weeks later, 
Cade’s estranged husband arrived at Cade’s workplace, doused her 
with gasoline, and set her on fire.285 Cade suffered severe burns all 
over her body and endured eighteen operations.286 Cade will be 
recovering from her physical and emotional injuries for life. When 
later asked about his decision to remove the protective order, the 
judge remarked that it was a “clerical error.”287 
Stories like Cade’s underscore the importance of protecting 
women who are trying to use the system to end the violence in their 
lives. When a batterer violates his protective order, he needs to be 
immediately punished. If a batterer is let out on bail, his victim needs 
to be contacted immediately so that she can prepare and make a 
safety plan.288 In the courthouse, measures need to be in place so 
that women do not have to sit in unsecured rooms with their 
batterers for hours.289 If the criminal justice system provides more 
protection for these women, they will be more willing and better 
able to participate in the prosecution process.  
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3. The criminal justice system’s negative response toward battered 
women 
In addition to a lack of material resources and physical safety, the 
quality of victims’ interactions with actors in the criminal justice 
system affects their willingness to participate in the prosecution of 
their batterers.290 One survey found that women “were more afraid 
of the courts and the law than they were of harming their 
relationship with” their partner or retaliation from their partner.291 
Women were most concerned that prosecutors would not prepare 
them for trial and that the defendant would not be found guilty.292  
Prosecutors need to make sure that they communicate with 
victims and that they inform victims of what to expect during the 
prosecution process. Prosecutors also need to reassure them about 
the process. Deborah Epstein cites an example of a woman in 
Washington D.C. who failed to appear as a witness in the criminal 
prosecution of her batterer.293 When asked why, she explained that 
during her civil protective order hearing, she had pled with the judge 
to jail her perpetrator.294 He told her that he did not have the power 
to do so.295 For that reason, she thought it was futile to attend the 
criminal cases; no one had explained to her the difference between 
the two proceedings.296 Eve and Carl Buzawa have also documented 
how ill informed domestic violence victims are about the prosecution 
process, which can lead to high rates of victim attrition.297 
In addition to a lack of communication and information, some 
actors in the criminal justice system sometimes exhibit a negative 
response to battered women. As previously discussed in Part III, 
women of color are often hesitant to contact the police because 
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historically their communities have had negative interactions with 
law enforcement. More generally, prosecutors often do not 
understand why victims refuse to leave abusive partners or to help 
with the prosecution of their batterers.298 This misunderstanding can 
make some prosecutors indifferent and cynical.299 Prosecutors also 
may erect barriers that “test” the commitment of victims to 
prosecute.300 This attitude can lead more victims to drop charges or 
not to appear in court.301 The victims’ actions then continue to 
reinforce the beliefs of prosecutors, police, and other staff that 
becoming involved in domestic violence cases is futile.302 Thus, there 
is a vicious cycle between the lack of cooperation of victims and the 
negative attitudes among legal actors that result from this lack of 
cooperation. 
Another study found that court clerks, who were supposed to 
help women file protective orders, provided little assistance to 
women with special needs such as literacy barriers and language 
translation.303 In addition, some clerks actively discouraged women 
from filing protective orders.304 
Finally, Deborah Tuerkheimer and Alafair S. Burke have argued 
that the criminal law itself also may limit the willingness of victims to 
participate in the prosecution of their batterers.305 The law focuses 
on individual instances of physical violence within an abusive 
relationship, and it ignores prior violence in evaluating whether a 
crime has been committed.306 Yet, prior abuse is quite relevant in 
understanding the batterer’s “continuing effort to control his 
victim.”307 The law restricts the victim’s ability to explain this 
dynamic as part of her personal narrative. Alafair explains, 
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Cognizant of the statutory elements of the offense that must be 
proven, police and prosecutors hone in on only the severity of the 
physical contact involved in the discrete incident. They do not ask 
her about the ways in which he tried to limit her agency, restrict 
her options, and make her feel small. If she offers these anecdotes 
anyway, no one will make note of them because the current law 
renders them unimportant. If she tells her story the way she 
perceives it, and continues to talk about legally irrelevant aspects of 
her relationship, she might be reprimanded as a bad witness.308 
Tuerkheimer and Alafair argue that this incongruity between the 
law and the actual experiences of domestic violence victims limits the 
victims’ satisfaction with the criminal justice system and their 
willingness to participate in the prosecution of their batterers.309 
For all of these reasons, it is important that actors in the criminal 
justice system become better educated about domestic violence and 
about the reasons why victims may be hesitant to cooperate in the 
prosecution of their batterers. An increased understanding about the 
dynamics of domestic violence may lead legal actors to become more 
sensitive to these women when they seek assistance. These actors 
then will be better able to provide adequate information about the 
criminal and civil process. Furthermore, communities specifically 
need to address and remedy the causes of poor relations between 
legal actors and people of color. Cooperation on the part of these 
actors is essential if women are going to take an active role in 
prosecutions. Finally, laws that reflect the ongoing nature of the 
abusive relationship may allow victims to accurately tell their 
narratives, which may increase their satisfaction with the criminal 
justice system and their willingness to participate in the prosecution 
of their batterers. 
B. Chicago’s TAC Model 
Cook County, Illinois, has successfully implemented a 
prosecution-based collaborative approach in which service providers, 
community advocacy groups, civil attorneys, and prosecutors work 
together in one unit.310 The County’s program, known as TAC 
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(“Target Abuser Call”), encourages victim participation by directly 
addressing the reasons that women do not testify. TAC provides 
victims with a variety of services to address their immediate problems 
and helps them to prepare for the future.311 
Cook County’s State Attorney Richard Devine has found that 
when services are not immediately accessible to the victim, she often 
does not follow through on seeking out these services and stays 
trapped in a violent situation.312 For that reason, TAC provides on-
site services to address economic and other concerns.313 When 
adequately funded, as many as eighty percent of TAC victims have 
appeared and participated in the prosecution process, and TAC has 
had an eighty to ninety percent conviction rate.314 
TAC focuses on high-risk misdemeanor cases.315 It looks for 
repeat offenders at the misdemeanor level in order to stem violence 
before it escalates.316 A focus group of lethality experts came up with 
a list of high risk factors for escalating violence: strangulation, 
resisting arrest, violation of orders of protection, status of the 
relationship (for example, has the victim indicated to the offender 
that the relationship is terminated?), public incidents of violence, and 
stressors, such as the offender’s job status and his response to the 
relationship’s termination.317 The most important factor is whether 
the victim has indicated to the offender that she wants to end the 
relationship.318 
The TAC unit has prosecutors with felony experience.319 
Seasoned prosecutors “send a message to the judiciary that 
[domestic violence] cases should be taken seriously.”320 The unit also 
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has a victim specialist who makes sure that victims understand court 
proceedings, completes order of protection paperwork for the victim, 
and makes telephone calls reminding the victim of court dates and 
assisting in securing evidence.321  
A few days after the violent incident, an investigator from TAC 
will begin building a relationship with the victim. The investigator 
serves a subpoena during this visit, but she also takes the time to 
explain the prosecution process to the victim, reassures her that she 
will receive assistance throughout this process, gives the victim the 
names of everyone on the TAC team, answers questions, and 
conducts a follow-up investigation.322 
To ensure that the victim is safe and that her non-court needs are 
met, the independent advocate provides access to shelter and 
counseling and helps the victim create a safety plan.323 Her files are 
confidential and cannot be released to anyone without the victim’s 
written consent.324 In addition, the independent advocate assists with 
obtaining resources after the victim’s case is over.325 
The civil law attorney helps the victim with family law, child 
support, custody, and visitation issues and with orders of 
protection.326 The victim’s civil cases continue regardless of the 
disposition of her criminal case.327 TAC also monitors offenders for 
sentence and probation violations.328 Once a violation is detected, 
the defendant’s case is immediately set for hearing within a few days, 
and the victim is notified immediately of the violation.329 In addition, 
the investigator assists in securing the victim’s safety.330 
Thus, TAC includes the victim in the prosecution process by 
directly addressing the economic and safety needs that often make 
her reluctant to seek the prosecution of her batterer. It also provides 
a supportive, cooperative environment that takes away any sense of 
alienation she might feel in the typical prosecution scenario. 
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C. Challenges to the Systematic Implementation of the TAC Model 
While the TAC program is encouraging because it demonstrates 
that there are contexts where domestic violence victims will testify 
against their batterers, it will take some time before testifying 
domestic violence victims will become the rule rather than the 
exception. First, domestic violence victims and legal actors are going 
to have to be convinced that victims can and will testify before it can 
be expected that they will not view such programs as futile. Second, 
most jurisdictions have limited resources that curb their ability to 
create a program similar to TAC.331 For these reasons, just as TAC 
has done, jurisdictions may have to limit the TAC model to a small 
subset of “high risk” batterers to overcome the “sticky norm” and 
limited resources problems.  
The problem of “sticky norms” exists when the “prevalence of a 
social norm makes decisionmakers reluctant to carry out a law 
intended to change that norm.”332 In other words, if a law condemns 
a norm that is socially acceptable, the police are going to be reluctant 
to arrest individuals who break that law, and prosecutors are going 
to be reluctant to charge the individuals with crimes.333 As a result, 
the law is not enforced, and the social norm does not change.334 In 
addition, making the law harsher only exacerbates the reluctance of 
legal actors.335 
In order to change social norms through the law, Dan Kahan 
advocates for “gentle nudges.”336 He argues that if the law 
condemns behavior only slightly, the typical decisionmaker will want 
to discharge her civic duty, will override her reluctance to condemn 
the law, and will ultimately enforce the law.337 Following her 
                                                
 331. In 2003, it was reported that TAC only took about 1920 cases per year. JANE M. 
SADUSKY, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUST. PROJECT CRIM. JUST. CENTER, COMMUNITY POLICING 
& DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FIVE PROMISING PRACTICES 31 (2003), http://data.ipharos.com/ 
bwjp/documents/COPS%20DV%20Monograph%20Rev%20Aug04.pdf. This number was far 
below the almost 70,000 cases of domestic violence cases reported in Chicago that year. Id. It 
should be noted that funding from government grants for TAC has been reduced since the 
program’s inception. Ford, supra note 314. 
 332. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges v. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000). 
 333. Id. at 607–08. 
 334. Id. at 608. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. at 608. See also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, & HAPPINESS (Caravan 2008). 
 337. Id. 
BAILEY.PP3 1/30/2009 3:09 PM 
101] Deconstructing the Sound of Silence 
 153 
example, other decisionmakers will also enforce the law.338 Once this 
enforcement becomes common practice, lawmakers can then increase 
the degree of condemnation by a little more.339 
Within the domestic violence context, Kahan notes that domestic 
violence laws condemn the social norm of occasional violence.340 He 
suggests shaming and civil and contempt remedies as initial gentle 
nudges to encourage decisionmakers to enforce domestic violence 
laws.341 He also discusses the use of specialized departments that will 
enforce domestic violence laws; these departments can be comprised 
of decisionmakers who specifically believe in enforcing these laws.342 
The social norm of occasional violence may be waning due to the 
mandatory policies that have been in place over the last several years. 
Victimless prosecutions, however, have become common practice, 
and there may be the sticky norm or belief that domestic violence 
victims cannot and will not testify. Domestic violence victims believe 
this norm and so do legal actors. Legal actors, therefore, will be 
resistant to a program that they may view as futile and as a waste of 
limited time and resources. For this reason, I realize that many legal 
actors are going to try to fit as many out-of-court statements as 
possible under Davis’ definition of a testimonial statement. 
Related to the “sticky norm” problem is the fact that 
jurisdictions have limited resources. Although VAWA 2005 
reauthorized more funding for grants that may be able to support 
programs similar to TAC,343 the Act did not actually fund these 
grants; it is up to Congress to appropriate funding in its budget each 
year for similar state-run programs. Furthermore, it is doubtful that 
the amount authorized under VAWA 2005 will be enough. In 
addition, state and local funding will be limited in most jurisdictions. 
For these reasons, it cannot be overemphasized how limited 
resources are likely to still be an obstacle to creating inclusive 
programs like TAC within the foreseeable future. In addition, it may 
be the case that not all cases can or should be handled by the 
criminal justice system because of limited resources and because it 
may not in the best interest of every victim to pursue a resolution 
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through prosecution. Jurisdictions might have to determine which 
cases are most appropriately handled through prosecution and 
allocate their resources accordingly. 
For these reasons, the gentle nudge that this Article proposes in 
response to these sticky norm and limited resource problems is, just 
as TAC has done, limiting the use of this model to a small subset of 
victims of “high risk” batterers. In cases where victims are in greater 
danger, perhaps legal actors will have an incentive to keep in more 
constant contact with them, to provide them with more protection, 
and to press forward with prosecution to make sure that the batterer 
gets off of the street. Limiting the caseload to “high risk” offenders 
may also make more individualized attention to the victims less 
taxing on the prosecutor’s time and resources. Finally, jurisdictions 
that are able to create a specialized department like TAC may be able 
to hand pick individuals who are committed to creating more of a 
partnership between domestic violence victims and the criminal 
justice system. If this limited model is successful in encouraging 
more victim participation, legal actors may themselves advocate for 
more resources to expand the model to more victims. Yet, even if 
jurisdictions do not expand this model to more victims, increasing 
the participation of at least some domestic violence victims is a 
significant step away from victim silence. 
CONCLUSION 
Participants in the women’s movement originally were concerned 
about domestic violence because its proponents wanted women to 
be physically, mentally, and emotionally safe and because they 
believed that domestic violence was a symptom of the legal and 
political subordination women suffered both inside and outside of 
the home. Frustrated that the criminal justice system was largely 
ignoring this problem, they lobbied for an institutional response. As 
a result of these efforts, states have made significant changes in 
domestic violence criminal laws and policies. 
Under mandatory arrest and prosecution policies, however, there 
is a danger that the criminal justice system will focus on increasing 
the number of arrests and prosecutions of domestic violence 
perpetrators and not on the goals of safety, gender equality, and 
autonomy. While victimless prosecutions empower prosecutors to 
increase the number of perpetrators prosecuted, it is questionable as 
to whether a nondiscriminatory use of this practice is effective in 
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meeting the original goals of the women’s movement. It is not clear 
that all women are safer when they do not testify or participate in the 
prosecution of their batterers. Given this fact, victimless prosecutions 
may be problematic because they encourage the silence of women, 
and speech is an important tool of political and legal empowerment.  
Given the potential harm of some victimless prosecutions and the 
effects of Crawford and Davis on this practice, it seems wise to 
consider the benefits of increased victim participation. While there 
may be circumstances where victimless prosecutions are necessary in 
the domestic violence context, there are many circumstances where 
victims can and should participate in the prosecution process. 
Chicago’s TAC program is one model that suggests that victim 
participation is possible.  
Because of limited resources and the skepticism that many 
victims and legal actors may have that victims can and will testify, 
many jurisdictions may have to take small steps in implementing this 
type of model. One such step could be focusing on the victims of 
high-risk offenders. In jurisdictions that do implement this model, 
there will, of course, still be those women who will not want to 
participate in the prosecution of their batterers. Indeed, there may be 
victims who will never contact the criminal justice system at all 
because they are afraid of testifying. There will also be women whose 
best interest is not served by testifying or by following through with 
the prosecution. For these reasons, my proposal for a more inclusive 
approach is not a panacea for domestic violence, and other solutions 
both inside and outside of the criminal justice system are also 
necessary in stemming this problem. Nevertheless, with respect to 
the criminal justice system, I encourage scholars to consider whether 
increased victim participation is a better long-term solution to 
domestic violence than silence. 
 
